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Abstract
Using measures of central tendency, the average non US-based institutional investor has
more capital invested in securities than his US-based counterpart. The present study shows
that US-based investors favour manufacturing companies, whereas Canadian investors prefer
companies based in natural resources. Nationally, Toronto acts more as the centre of gravity
for Canadian institutional investors than New York City does for the United States.
Comparatively, Toronto accounts for 70% of all Canadian investors while New York accounts
for only 30% of the American total, despite it being the city with the most capital invested
worldwide. Notwithstanding Alberta’s oil boom, inter-provincial investment capital show that
Ontario is the leading province for receiving investment capital from Canadian sources, as
well as investing institutional capital across Canada. Locally, investors in Montreal and
Toronto are more spatially clustered than their American counterparts (Chicago and New
York), since both Canadian cities are devoid of investors located in suburban areas.
Keywords: Canada, Institutional Investment, Finance, Financial Geography, Median
Polish, Montreal, Toronto, New York, Chicago
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Institutional investors are professional investors that invest not only their money, but the
money of other investors such as high net worth individuals, pension plans, endowments,
banks and insurance companies in order to derive the best return possible according to the
level of risk that the investor is comfortable with. While this phenomenon took time to
catch-on, by the mid-1970s a relative handful of investors were commanding vast sums of
money anonymously in order to buy and sell substantial portions of the economy’s productive
forces. This new phenomenon was studied at the behest of the United States Congress and
resulted into a system of mandated public disclosure of what stocks are held by institutional
investors. This mechanism for disclosure is called 13F disclosure after the section in the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 that was amended to mandate it.
The 13F disclosure form is quite spartan in its information since it only contains the work
address of the person responsible for the investment, the name of the stock as well as its
1
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CUSIP number1, the number shares held as well as the best estimate of the value of the
shares. However, tying this information to other databases can make the data much richer for
the researcher. For example, by running the addresses though Esri’s geocoding tool, each filler
now has a latitude and longitude, and thereby opening the doors to different ways of analysing
the data.
1.1 Economic Geography or Geographical Economics?
Historically, there are two main approaches for attempting to describe the intersection of
space and economic activities: Economic Geography and Geographical Economics.
Economic Geography, as a traditional sub-discipline of Geography, looks to examine
economic activities over space, and as such is concerned with spatial patterns and
organizations. Whereas, Geographical Economics, also known as New Economic Geography,
borrows from the traditions of Economics, by trying to explain spatial phenomena via abstract
and simplified mathematical modelling. As a rule, Economic Geography is more eclectic than
Geographical Economics, often willing to trade mathematical precision and rigour for new
conceptualizations in order to gain insights to the problem (Arnott and Wrigley 2001).
In fact, Scott argues that there has been a shift in the field of Economic Geography toward
1CUSIP stands for Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures, which is run by S&P Capital
IQ. The CUSIP number is a unique ten digit identifier for securities, bonds, ETFs and other financial instruments
(CUSIP Global Services 2013)
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Geographical Economics. This shift is more than just semantics, since it displays a shift in the
prestige in the field as well as different starting point for attacking questions (Scott 2004).
The last 25 years has seen an explosion of interest by economists into the intertwined
subjects of space and location to the detriment of Geographical based approaches (Ma¨ki and
Marchionni 2011). This foray was instigated by the work of Paul Krugman and his “New
Economic Geography”, a body of work that would earn him the 2008 Sveriges Riksbank Prize
in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (Nobel Media AB 2008). This new
approach give mathematical models to discursive ideas, such as modelling economic growth
in a region as an equilibrium between forces of agglomeration and dispersion, as well as
giving formal models for linkages and spatially balanced growth. In effect, the main thrust of
New Economic Geography is to attempt to integrate the concept of space into the mainstream
economic discourse which historically ignored many of the physical constrains of markets
(Arnott and Wrigley 2001).
When founding the Journal of Economic Geography in 2001, Arnott and Wrigley had a
vision to reverse the academic imperialism of Economics by giving equal weight to both the
economic and geographical based perspectives to pressing question in the field and to give a
venue for the intersection of multiple disciplines working on the same themes (Arnott and
Wrigley 2001; Arnott and Wrigley 2003; Bodman et al. 2013).
According to Ma¨ki and Marchionni (2011), appropriating another discipline’s style may
improve understanding on a subject by introducing new tools and methodological approaches
Chapter 1. Introduction 4
to a problem. It may also depreciate methods that answered particular human and epistemic
demands.
That being said, if certain methods depreciate to the point of near extinction, re-examining
old questions with traditional techniques and new data will give insights that may appear as if
they were new. Therefore, using traditional epistemological approaches to Economic
Geography is not just an exercise of re-claiming academic ground, but rather a re-examination
of the problem using previous methods in a modern era.
“Defending our version of economic geography is also defending our identity and our
‘cultural existence’ as a discipline and as individuals.” (Schoenberger 2001, p.379)
1.2 Geography still matters
Historically, investing has been a geographically concentrated activity, limited to large cities
in advanced economies. However, literature from the mid-1990s shows that many investors
left the central business districts in favour of more peripheral locations due to more advanced
telecommunications (Bodenman 1998; Clark and Wo´jcik 2003). That being said, even though
the Internet shrunk the effective distances between points on the Earth like no other human
innovation, nobody is running a trading desk from the bottom of the Marianas Trench. As such,
the “frictionless world of the Internet” still has some rough areas. Therefore, can geography
still be used to describe the spatial location of investors? Furthermore, is such distinctions
Chapter 1. Introduction 5
exist, are Canadian investors different than American investors?
1.3 Scope
These questions are examined in the following chapters. Chapter 2 looks at the literature of
institutional investment, defines institutional investors as well as to how spatial analysis is
used to draw insights from such an endeavour. The following chapter examines the
institutional investor disclosure forms, its strengths and limitations, as well as to how the data
was manipulated into a usable format. With the literature and the methods out of the way, the
next three chapters are organized by scale with the international comparisons in chapter 4, an
analysis of Canada in chapter 5 and the city to city comparisons between Montreal, Toronto,
Chicago and New York in chapter 6.
Chapter 2
Literature Review
This chapter contextualizes terms and concepts associated with institutional investment, such
as the different forms that institutional investors may take, their reporting requirements and
the market conditions at the time of the study. It also examines the previous literature on
institutional investment, economic geography and the differences between Canada and the
United States’ banking history.
2.1 What is institutional Investment
Broadly speaking, an institutional investor, as defined by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), is an entity, be it a natural person or a legal construct, that exercises
investment discretion - that is allocates funds over various investments - over the funds of one
or more individuals or corporations. As such, institutional investors can be banks, insurance
companies, pension funds, investment broker-dealers, hedge funds, and corporations(15 U.S.
Code §78m (f) ). These institutional investors function by gathering funds and investing them
6
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in different assets in order to pool risk and generate a higher return on a more consistent basis
via economies of scale than individual investors can on their own1. (Davis and Steil 2001).
In terms of history, institutional investors date back to at least the presidency of Theodore
Roosevelt (1901 - 1909), however as a class they never amounted to more than five percent of
the total US equities market until after the Second World War (Blume and Keim 2012). An
important study by Friedman (1996) shows that the total aggregate holdings of institutional
investors grew very rapidly in absolute and relative terms, accounting for nearly 10% of the
total US equities market in 1950 to over 50% in 1994. Gompers and Metrick (2001) push the
time horizon further, estimating that institutional investors account for over half of all
outstanding shares of the US equities market by December, 1996 and according to Blume and
Keim (2012), the holdings of all institutional investors in the US market account for 67% of
the total equities market as of December, 20102.
1It should be noted that there may be some surface similarities between institutional investors and mutual
funds. Both collect funds and invest it in various asset classes with the hope that they would accrue value over
time, however they differ in many substantial ways that stem from the different regulatory regimes under which
they operate. Mutual funds are principally governed by the Investment Company Act of 1940 and the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940. On the other hand, whilst institutional investors are governed by the Security and Exchange
Act of 1934, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 as well as some primary client related laws and regulation such
as the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) for defined benefit pension plans, they are exempt from
the Investment Company Act of 1940. This different regulatory framework has led to specialization of cliente`le
where mutual funds cater to many small investors whereas institutional accounts cater to larger investors such
as defined benefit pension funds, charitable trusts, university endowments and high net worth individuals. Since
these different investment organizations serve different cliente`le, it is no surprise that goals and risk profiles differ,
although it should be said that there is a large variation of strategy within each category of investment vehicle
(Investment Company Institute 2006).
2The date of the data in this thesis
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2.1.1 Insurance Companies
Insurance companies are the oldest form of institutional investment. The basic model of an
insurance company can be simplified to the following three points:
• Collect money from premiums as well as other investors looking for annuities.
• Use economies of scale in order to get the best returns at the lowest possible risk .
• Pay-out money as contractually obligated.
During that last step, the insurance company hopes that actuaries calculated an accurate
odds of payment so that the company pays out less than the sum total of the premiums received
and the interest earned on the invested capital. As a result of an uncertain time horizon for
payment, these firms tend to favour short lived and liquid investments3, such as stocks with a
high daily trade volume (Davis and Steil 2001).
2.1.2 Banks
As with insurance companies, banks are in theory the most risk-averse institutional investors4
(Del Guercio 1996). They are classified under various regulatory categories such as
investment, commercial and depository. After the banking reforms of the 1930s tightly
regulated American banking, to the point that there was no appreciable overlap between the
different types of banks. Successive waves of deregulation starting in the 1980s saw a wave of
regulatory liberalization culminating in the GrammLeachBliley Act of 1999. This bill blurred
3The adjective liquid indicates the ability for an asset to be sold-off rapidly at near market price. The converse
is an illiquid asset and due to having very few willing buyers - the seller must discount the sale price in order to
conduct a transaction in a short period of time.
4That being said, these two corporate forms were central to the 2008 banking collapse (AIG, Bear Sterns and
Lehman Brothers) due principally to their under-estimation of risk. (Smith 2010)
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the distinctions between various types of banks more-or-less removing all limitations on the
types of economic activity banks may perform such as diversifying in both investment and
retail banking as wells as related FIRE sector activities such as insurance(Calomiris 2000).
Canadian banks, operating outside of American jurisdiction, were never subject to the
GlassSteagall Act of 1933 or any similar prohibition of mixing depositor money with
investment activities. Modern Canadian and American banks are now highly diversified
operations, using their size to become single source providers for financial services. As such,
modern banks function as an amalgamation of all types of institutional investors (Smith 2010).
2.1.3 Pension Funds
Pension funds in the United States can be traced as far back as the American Civil War. These
early funds are different than modern pension funds since they are either highly invested in the
same company for which the employee works, or heavily invested in US sovereign debt. Both
approaches are problematic; in the first instance, an employee’s pension is inextricably tied to
the financial health of his employer and therefore risks losing his pension upon the bankruptcy
of the company. On the other hand, US sovereign debt is a secure financial instrument due to
the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution, which prevents the US Government of wilfully
reneging on the payment of its debts. That being said, the rate of interest on US debt is very
low, and quite often finds itself below the rate of inflation and thereby eroding the value of the
underlying capital moving forward (Drucker 1976).
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The first modern pension plan was set up by General Motors in 1950, under the leadership
of then CEO and future Secretary of Defence Charles Wilson, with the goal of
professionalizing the management of pension funds and decoupling the fate of the fund from
the company that sponsored it. In effect, this was the first defined benefit pension. This type of
fund guarantees employees a set payment at retirement, usually a certain percentage of the
their salary, after having contributed to the fund for a certain amount of time. By granting a
set payment to retirees, the sponsoring company undertakes nearly all the risk in the scheme,
such as recession or inflation eating away at the underlying capital in the fund and thus having
to make-up the shortfall out of the company’s bottom line, or of having an age imbalance in
the plan and therefore having younger employees subsidizing the golden years of retirees.
Lastly, these funds require many years before employees can be fully vested in the retirement
scheme, and therefore this type of pension can be a disadvantage for those who want to
change jobs mid-career.
The second type of pension, the defined contribution pension, tries to offer employees a
more transferable pension via a different organizational structure. In its simplest form, a
defined contribution pension plan is when an employer offers a set contribution to an
employee’s escrow account for the purpose of investing in the market. Since an employer’s
role end after the transfer of funds, this plan is easily transferable from job to job. However,
this portability comes at the cost of transferring the risk of a market downturn from the
employer to the employee (Drucker 1976).
A close reading of the relevant literature as well as the rules and regulations published by
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the SEC would indicate that since defined contribution plans are pooled on an individual
basis, defined contribution pension funds do not appear in a list of individual institutional
investors like say the Ontario Teacher Pension Plan, but rather as a part of larger institutional
investors like Vanguard or as part of a bank’s trading portfolio.
2.1.4 Hedge Funds
As a class of institutional investors, hedge funds are in an interesting position since they cater
exclusively to high net worth individuals and other institutional investors — both classified by
the SEC as ‘sophisticated investors’ — instead of the public at large. As such, they are the
least regulated of all institutional investors (Naik and Tapley 2007).
It is relatively common to see pension funds, school endowments and even trusts to invest
part or all of their capital with hedge funds in attempt to get superior returns, while preserving
the initial capital. It must be stressed that the principle goal of hedge funds, when compared
the other institutional investors, is to not to simply outperform the market (generating a three
percent loss during a market loss of five percent), but to preserve the underlying capital even
during a down market (Ubide 2006). This is achieved via sophisticated trading strategies such
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as leverage 5, options trading6 and price arbitrage 7. While generalizing such a broad category
of institutional investors is problematic and could be misleading, work by Griffin and Xu
(2009) shows that as rule, hedge funds prefer to invest in smaller and more opaque companies
than mutual funds.
During the market crash of 2008, some hedge funds were surging forth as phoenixes from
the ashes of the smoldering wrecks of large banks such as Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch,
as well as the total collapse of Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers. The contrast was sharp, for
when Merrill Lynch lost 19.2 billion USD (Story 2008) from July 2007 to July 2008, John
Paulson’s hedge fund made nearly 4 billion USD in the same period by betting against the US
housing market. Admittedly, John Paulson’s performance is an outlier, however it is a striking
example of a hedge fund making money in the face of a generation defining market failure.
5Leverage is the use of borrowed funds in order to amplify the gains and the losses on an investment. For
example if an investor with 1000 USD buy 10 stocks for 100 USD each and sell the stocks the next day for 110
USD a share, he would net a profit of 100 USD. Alternatively by using leverage the investor could use the 1000
USD as collateral to borrow 10 000 UDS and buy the stocks at 100 USD per share and sell them for 110 USD
the next day would net 1000 USD in profit. Conversely, if the price of the share had dropped to 90 USD rather
than appreciate to 110 USD, the first investor would lose 100 USD and be left with 900 USD. On the other hand,
the leveraged investor would be completely wiped out. In such a scheme, the higher the percentage of borrowed
funds to the underlying capital, the smaller the downturn is needed in order to eliminate the position (Smith 2010)
6An option is a financial derivative that permits a trader to bet on the appreciation or depreciation of a stock
without having to own the stock when placing the bet. There are two types of options, calls and puts. Buying
a call options gives the trader the option without the requirement to buy a stock at a certain price at or before a
set date in the future, and the put option is essentially the reverse. Therefore, if stock is valued advantageously
vis-a-vis the call option price, the trader can exercise the option and immediately turn around and sell the newly
bought stock on the open market for profit and vise-versa for a put option. (Smith 2010)
7The efficient market hypothesis predicts that information flows are near instantaneous and new information
is always factored into the price of a thing just as rapidly. However, in the real world there are occasions where
identical things are priced differently on different markets. The goal of arbitrage is to rapidly buy the things from
the lower priced market and sell it on the more expensive market for a profit. What’s important is not the profit
on an individual trade, but how often that trade can be repeated. A fraction of a cent’s profit per trade, if executed
many times by a computer will still net an important return.
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2.2 13F
A careful reading of the relevant literature on institutional investment shows a great depth of
possible uses for 13F reports for studying institutional investors as well as many personal
finance articles on how to use 13F forms for investment advice. Nevertheless, none of these
articles look into the detailed history of the passage of the bill, which is unfortunate since a
glance at the history of the 13F form can help bring insights into the strengths and weakness
of this fertile research tool.
Section 13F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) was created in 1975 and
signed into law by President Gerald Ford. However, the history of the section 13F of SEA is
the result of many legislative attempts to reduce the perception of corruption and collusion in
government and business by increasing transparency, especially in the wake of the ongoing
Watergate scandal (Shaw 1981).
The original impetus for the change in legislation can be traced to the 1968-1971 study
commissioned by the 92ed Congress 8 (H.R. Doc No.64, 1971). This congressional study was
tasked to investigate the effects — pernicious and beneficial — of the rapid increase in
market-share of institutional investors within the US securities sector and recommended to
Congress legislation that would give regulators the tools to better understand and deal
effectively with this phenomenon. That study found that despite the contemporary popular
mistrust of institutional investors, the investigators could not find conclusive evidence that
8January 3, 1971 to January 3, 1973
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institutional investors played a negative role within the market by promoting the use of
anticompetitive practises such as block trading and front-running 9. On the other hand, the
report was able to dispel some concerns over suspected problems, such as the fear of
imminent domination of American industry by institutional investors, and develop and test a
methodology based on regular and timely disclosure of data that is the precursor to the current
reporting standards. The report recommended the creation of a system of periodic disclosures
for institutional investors to government regulators in order to increase long term confidence
in the market by reducing the perception of corruption and collusion (H.R. Doc No.64, 1971).
The question of legislating mandatory disclosure was seen by the Wall Street Journal as a
subsidiary motion to the banking reform (Zimmerman 1971). The bill died with the end of the
92nd Congress on January 2nd 1973, since many members of Congress believed that the
proposed conflict of interest provisions for interlocking directorates in the bill were overly
broad (The Washington Post Editorial Board 1971).
Yet the idea remained popular within legislative circles, and during the final days of the
Nixon administration, an enthusiastic Senator Harrison William (D-NJ) 10 severed the
institutional investor disclosure provisions from the conflict of interest bill and drafted two
bills for debating and future implementation of these ideas.
This second attempt at passing an institutional disclosure law occurred during the second
9The practice of anticipating large trades by other investors, and taking advantage to such a trade by acting as
a middlemans, theirby incresing the final sell price of the trade. This is more-or-less the practice of insider trading
on a very short timescale (Khan and Lu 2013).
10Ironically Senator Williams is also the only member of the Senate convicted during the “ABSCAM”
investigation into Congressional corruption. (Gershman 1982)
Chapter 2. Literature Review 15
sitting of the 93rd Congress. During the final days of the Nixon administration, Senator
Harrison Williams (D-NJ) presented two bills in front of the Senate Securities subcommittee.
The first bill (S.2234) was drafted by Senator Williams and the other was drafted by the SEC
(S.2683) (United States Senate, 1974). Of these bills, S.2234 offered a more ambitious set of
reforms, such as a broader definition of who is an institutional investor, a lower threshold for
reporting (10 million USD for investment managers and 5 million USD for a broker-dealer or
exchange member) and the inclusion of illiquid assets such as but not limited to real estate
investments, investment grade art, bonds, cash deposits, commodities etc..., under the
reporting requirements (United States Senate, 1974). During hearings on this bill, many
Senators such as Wallace Bennet (R- Utah) remarked that any changes to the Securities and
Exchanges Act of 1934 should thread the fine line between public disclosure and the
constitutional right to privacy. 11 On the other hand, the aims of S.2683 were more modest in
scope; this bill is almost identical to the current section 13F of the Securities and Exchange
Act (SEA) and thus received the approval of the subcommittee. In its opinion, it was able to
strike a balance between privacy and disclosure as well as being more technically feasible
since only the most liquid asset class was to be reported. The main objection to the inclusion
of other asset classes was the lack of an accurate near-realtime mechanism for evaluating the
worth of illiquid assets. However, since the bid and ask prices for stocks were readily
11Senator Bennett’s opening remarks to the subcommittee on Securities of the Committee on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs:
“Just one little footnote. It is interesting for me to sit here today and talk about disclosure
and to have sat in the House last night and heard the President of the United States [Gerald Ford]
dedicate himself to the preservation of the right to privacy. So I suppose our problem includes,
among other things, the question of exactly where we will draw the line between the demand
for disclosure and the right to privacy.” (Hearings before the Subcommittee on Securities of the
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress,
Second Session on August 18th 1974 )
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available via stock exchanges, this would eliminate the need for costly and potentially
inaccurate appraisals on a quarterly basis. While the bill passed in the Senate, it was killed in
the House Rules Committee due to active lobbying by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
and stockbrokers, who were displeased by a section of the house bill that would lower
brokerage rates (Wall Street Journal, 1974). During the lame duck session, Senator Williams
went on a publicity tour admonishing stockbrokers and the NYSE in order to build public
support for the bill (Dallos, 1974). The efforts of Senator Williams did not go unrewarded for
Senate Bill 249, a substantially identical bill, passed both houses of Congress and was signed
into law by President Gerald Ford on June 4th 1975 (Library of Congress).
2.3 The 2008 Crash and the Market Situation in December
2010
Previous studies on this topic have systematically failed to take into account the general health
of the market during the time of their studies. This section rectifies this. As we can see from
figure 2.1, the period under study takes place during the bull market following the 2008 stock
market crash, and except for a small dip in mid-to-late November 2010, the period under study
is more-or-less one of constant upward movement in both indices. More specifically, the period
under study shows a gain of 9.95% of its value (113.9 points) for the S&P500 and a gain of
6.91% (748 points) for the Dow Jones Industrial Average. While both indices are in general
agreement with each other, the different methodologies used in tracking the performance of
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the constituent parts of the indices are not identical and thus may lead to slightly different
outcomes.12
2.4 Why Geography and not Economics
2.4.1 The Death of Distance... or Not
Over the previous three decades, the death of Geography has been heralded many times. Of
particular note for this subject is the work by O’Brien (1992) that argued that the rise of
ubiquitous telecommunications technology and the free flow of capital markets signalled the
death of Geography. Similarly, Moriset and Malecki (2009) conclude that the communications
revolution led to a re-arrangement of spatial forces that changed the relative forces of
agglomeration and repulsion within a digital economy. This challenged the traditional
business hierarchy within the corporate form to a more horizontal alignment as well as the
hierarchy of place since telecommunication removes the premium of co-location. However, as
with the death of the great American writer Mark Twain, that announcement was premature13.
As previously mentioned, institutional investors operate with less regulatory oversight
than mutual fund managers with regards to using leverage and time horizon. However,
institutional investment managers share many of the same functions as managers for mutual
funds with regards to their equities portfolio, such as picking stocks and performing their due
12The Dow Jones is an average of the stock price of the 30 largest publicly traded US companies whereas The
S&P 500 is a market-weighted representative index of 500 large publicly traded companies. In short, both are
broadly representative of the US economy as a whole, they do not measure the exact same metrics.
13Twain’s death was announced when reporters misattributed his cousin’s health to his own.
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diligence research. Therefore, studies relating to the performance of equities from one type of
investment manager should be seen as broadly applicable to the other when dealing with
shared competencies.
The majority of the previous literature on the location of institutional investors focus on
using geography for trading advantage. One of the most comprehensive studies in using
geography in order to create abnormal returns is Coval and Moskowitz (1999) look at the
home bias in domestic equities portfolios. This paper found that there is a preference for small
highly-leveraged firms in the non-traded sector, indicating a possible use of information
asymmetry by acting on signs of distress in the firm. This was further examined by a (2001)
paper of the same authors that found that mutual fund managers obtained abnormally good
returns on local firms. This return is higher on small cap companies and older small funds in
remote areas. Strong hints that those managers are profiting from local knowledge during
trading. The authors speculate that while the effect may be true (ie. not a statistical artifact)
the pool of available candidates may be too small to efficiently profit from the effect on a large
scale.
In a similar vein, Hau (2001) looks at the possible advantages of having a trading desk
located in the same city as Frankfurt’s stock exchange. The author finds that traders in the
same city as the stock exchange outperform those outside only on an intra-day basis and the
difference is no longer statistically significant in the intra-week and intra-quarter timescale.
Furthermore, a time-insensitive advantage was language, for Hau found that non-native
German speakers were at a significant disadvantage to native speakers.
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A similar study by Dvorˇa´k (2005), this time with the Jakarta Stock Exchange found that
foreign based investors performed worse than domestic investors. Using time-series analysis
this study found that the gap in performance as measured by the spread in buy and sell price
purchases grew in favour of domestic investors over time. This finding was replicated using
the Korean Stock exchange by Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005), who found that foreign born
traders payed, on average, 21 basis points more than domestic traders when buying stocks,
and receiving 16 basis points less when selling stocks. Likewise, Teo (2009) finds that hedge
funds with offices in the same country as their investments will perform their peers who invest
in the same country but are headquartered outside of it. That being said, the strongest effect
was found in the developing world and in exotic or infrequently traded securities. Therefore,
knowledge of the local language gives a trader an advantage over competitors due to access to
better information.
Bodenman (2000) looks at the role of the information technology (IT) revolution in
permitting institutional investors to locate to non-core areas while still retaining access to the
quality and quantity of data available. Prior to the IT revolution, ubiquitous high quality
information was available exclusively to traders located in core areas. In fact, only two of an
institutional investor’s core duties (research and marketing/client management), require
physical interaction between the fund manager and the target company and the investors.
Nonetheless, the degree of interaction depends on the institutional investor’s strategy, for
passive funds require less hands-on contact than actively managed funds. On the other hand,
the three other core competencies: portfolio management, trading and accounting can be done
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remotely. That being said, the author finds that large funds may have larger logistical abilities
than smaller funds but the smaller funds are, generally, less risk-averse than the larger funds
and thus may exhibit higher returns on a year-to-year basis. Furthermore, there is a broad
trend between location and the type of investment firm. On the one hand, active traders are
almost exclusively in core areas whereas quantitative traders and passive traders tend to be
found in non-core settings such as suburbia.
As with Graves (1998) the author concludes that five cities, New York, Boston, Chicago,
San Francisco and Los Angeles, contain the majority of all mutual funds firms. However,
while these five cities did increase the total number of mutual funds companies in absolute
count as well as by total capital under management, the share that they represent of all mutual
fund firms and capital under management in the United States shrank. This trend also extends
to the twenty largest centres of mutual funds.
In another study by Bodenman (1998) - which was submitted for publication after
Bodenman (2000) but published earlier- looks at the location of investment firms within
Metropolitan Philadelphia from 1983 to 1993. This study found that the modern revolution in
telecommunications technology creat a precipitous drop in concentration of FIRE (Finance,
Insurance, and Real Estate) sector businesses in the Central Business District (CBD) from
74.9% of firms controlling tax-exempt assets (trusts, endowments...) as well as 61.9% of firms
in total to 24.7% and 24.9% respectively at the end of the study.
When the Bodenman (1998) study looks deeper into the attractive and repulsive forces, he
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finds that the top two reasons for firm location are personal preference and quality of life, and
that access to high quality data feeds are rather low on the list of deciding factors. This finding
is constant with a later paper by Gong and Keenan (2012) looking into the location of
financial firms in New York prior to and after the 9/11 attacks. Prior to the terrorist attacks,
firm managers were more likely to self-report that factors such as prestige, access to public
transportation as well as clients were the top three factors in deciding location. However, the
heightened sensitivity to the possibility of terrorism transformed those attributes into
liabilities in the minds of managers and employees since they felt that those attributes were
tied to locations that were more likely to be a target of a terrorism attack. Asking about
location factors in the post 9/11 New York, managers selected the need for office space,
building infrastructure and rental/land costs. In the before and after comparison, it comes as
no surprise that vulnerability to terrorism is the factor that exhibited the largest change in
value.
Furthermore, the Gong and Keenan (2012) paper also examines the spatial distribution of
financial firms in New York following the disruption caused by the Al Qaeda attack. The
researchers show that while firms did spread out from Manhattan to neighbouring counties in
the tri-state14 area for the first few years, firms slowly made their way back to Manhattan over
time due to agglomeration economies. This is not to say that there were no footloose firms
since a certain number of finance businesses did move outside of the New York Standard
Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA).
14New York, Connecticut and New Jersey
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2.4.2 Extension of Industrial Geography
Green (1993) examines inter-city ownership of American institutional investors by looking at
the geographic spread of American institutional investor holdings of a sample of Fortune 500
firms (n=395 institutional investors) for the year 1980. This study confirms the impression
that New York City is without peer within the hierarchy of financial cities and as such has the
highest concentration of same city holdings. In addition, this paper notices a steep drop-off in
importance outside of the top 5 cities. In other words, despite the top cities being quite
populous, institutional holdings are poorly correlated to city population — i.e. Hartford,
Connecticut has more institutional investor capital than more populous eastern seaboard cities
like Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. This paper tests whether firms are more likely to invest in
nearby firms, and the gravity model can explain six to nine percent of the investment pattern
as being a function of distance. That being said, the paper also finds that pension funds are
largely immune to this effect and contrary to expectations are more likely to invest outside of
their home region. Green (1993) concludes that these results are consistent with the Marxist
bank control theory.
The Green (1993) paper is followed up in 1995 by the same author by adding a time
dimension (1980 and 1990) and a more comprehensive sample of institutional investors
holding stocks of Fortune 500 firms (n=717 institutional investors) for the study. Once again
the author uses an ordinary least squares (OLS) gravity model to quantify the geographic
influence on holdings. This model uncovers a significant diffusion of investors in the 1990 set
vis-a-vis the 1980 data as the telecommunications revolution lowers the cost of distance and
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the rise of index funds places less of a premium on location for access to information. In
effect, the absolute number of institutional investors in New York increases, paradoxically
New York’s importance relative to the rest of the United States decreases.
A third important paper by (Meyer and Green 1996) looks at the spatial distribution over
time of mutual funds. This study finds that from 1940 to 1985 mutual funds are primarily
headquartered in core cities such as New York, Boston and Chicago, but that there is a
non-negligible amount in semi-core and lowest of all in peripheral cities. A log-linear analysis
looks at the interactions between the number of firms in a given year, location (core,
semi-core, periphery) and mutual fund type. The analysis finds that the three way interaction
is rejected, but a two way interaction containing two of the three terms can not be ruled out.
Digging deeper, the authors discover that the more profitable types of mutual funds are more
likely to be found in core cities and less profitable mutual fund types are more likely to be
found in peripheral cities. Although intuitive on some level, this study finds that the number
of mutual funds are correlated to the broader market conditions and that a depressed economy
can lead to less mutual funds.
Similar to the Green papers, Graves (1998) looks at the spatial dispersion of investments
from 1986 and 1996, however, this study analyzes the location of mutual funds companies
rather than institutional investors. This paper’s findings are consistent with the Green findings
with respect to spatial dispersion within the USA and over time. That being said, this paper
did not find a significant correlation between mutual fund company headquarters and banking
headquarters. Furthermore, this period finds a consolidation of assets toward larger funds as
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measured by the Gini coefficient of the total assets controlled by the funds.
After a long period of lying fallow, the field of looking at institutional investors has a
new paper in 2014 in which Green, O’Hagean and Lefebvre look at the broad geography of
institutional investors in the United States. This paper finds that despite living in an era of
“social networking” geography still plays a role in institutional finance. More specifically, the
authors find that New York is still the dominant city for institutional investors.
2.5 Canada and the United States of America
The most extensive literature comparing Canadian and American financial institutions relate
to their respective banking systems. As such, any differences between the systems can be used
as prima facie evidence that the two systems have different legal and constitutional bases, and
that by extension these differences extend to each country’s institutional investors since banks
are a form of institutional investor. Therefore, understanding how the structural differences
between the two banking systems influences each country’s forces of agglomeration and
dispersion within the respective FIRE sectors is necessary to derive insights into the national
institutional investor system.
Canada and the United States make for an interesting comparison. On the one hand, both
countries were at one time under the sovereignty the United Kingdom and were thus subject
to the same common set of laws; however both have diverged on parallel paths after gaining
independence from the mother country (Calomiris 2000). With regards to finance, the biggest
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difference between the two nations is the adoption of the “branch banking” model in Canada
versus the “local banking” model in the United States. The principle cause for this state of
divergence is primarily constitutional. The Supreme Court of the United States took the view
that in the absence of action from Congress, the regulation of banks did not fall under the
interstate commerce clause of the Constitution, and thus the states were free to set-up their
own provisions as they saw fit. From the presidency of Andrew Jackson (1829–1837) until the
presidency of James Earl “Jimmy” Carter (1977–1981), banking in the United States was
largely a state affair and thus single branch banks were the dominant corporate form in the US.
The 1970s saw the rise of foreign banks offering more competitive products to the American
market, and in response this led to a regulatory liberalization, permitting a limited form of
interstate banking. This process was accelerated by the 1982 amendment by Congress to the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which permitted branch banks to acquire distressed
banks across State lines, since this was a less expensive option than bailing out the bank using
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) funds. The final nail in the coffin of the unit
bank era was the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 which
permitted the next wave of mergers and acquisitions that led to the creations of a few large
national banks that were centre to the 2008 Wall Street crash (Calomiris and Haber 2014).
By contrast to the US model of unit banking, Canadian banks from an early date followed
a branch model. One of the major reasons for different paradigm lays in the Canadian
Constitution. Drafted at a later date, the Constitution, also known at the time as the British
North America Act (BNAA) of 1867, article 91, gave the federal government jurisdiction over
the financial sector; specifically banks, savings banks, weights and measures, coinage, legal
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tender, and interest. Article 92 of this same document gave the provinces jurisdiction over
private property and civil rights, thus creating a possible conflict of powers between two
branches of government. Which branch of government held power over securities law was
decided by Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 15 in the case of Lymburn et al vs.
Mayland et al (1932) in favour of the Provinces that securities and the laws regulating them
fell under article 92.13 (Property and Civil Rights) of the BNAA since securities were, in the
opinion of the Law Lords, better classified as private property than banking and commerce
instruments. This development led to Canada having a national banking regulatory system
that promoted branch banking on the one hand and a fragmented provincial securities markets
on the other. However, due to consolidation, only the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSM Group)
remains a significant exchange on the international stage.
These different historical trajectories left an indelible mark on the geography of banking
and other financial institutions in their respective countries. For one, despite having an order
of magnitude difference in both population and gross domestic product (GDP), there is a
larger difference in the number of banking institutions that would be expected if one is to rely
on such indicators. As of June 30th, 2013, there were 6,940 Institutions covered by FDIC
insurance in the US, of which 5,980 were classified as Commercial banks (Federal Deposit
Insurance Corperation 2013). By comparison, there were 151 depository institutions
supervised by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions Canada, of which 80
were classified as banks. (OSFI 2013).
15At the time that the case was filed the Supreme Court of Canada was the penultimate court of appeal within
Canada and cases could be appealed to the Privy Council in London England.
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The location of the headquarters of the largest banks in both countries is a study in
contrasts. Whereas the big-five Canadian banks 16 are all headquartered in Toronto, only five
of the eight largest American banks are headquartered in Manhattan, New York 17. The other
banks are headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts 18, Charlotte, North Carolina 19 and San
Francisco, California 20. Brunn and Leinbach (1991) suggest that this difference in location is
highly indicative of the forces of agglomeration financial systems. Since Canada does not
have the legacy of provincial banking regimes, the business headquarters of the big 5
Canadian banks are all in Toronto and within a few blocks of each other instead of being
straddled with legacy locations due to a large history of bank mergers (Code 1983).
This brief overview of Canadian and American banking shows that the differences between
the two countries financial systems are non-trivial, due of a plethora of documented historical
and geographical forces. Therefore conclusions from American studies would not necessarily
be applicable to the Canadian context.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter explores the different corporate forms that institutional investors may take under
the rules of the SEC, mainly investment companies, banks, pension funds and hedge funds.
16Bank of Montreal, Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Royal Bank of Canada and
Toronto-Dominion Bank
17Bank of New York Mellon, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan Chase and Morgan Stanley
18State Street
19Bank of America
20Wells Fargo
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Furthermore, this chapter examines the origins of the legislative amendment to the Securities
and Exchanges Act of 1934 that created section 13F and the reporting requirements there-in.
A major concern of the legislators who drafted the reporting requirements was to balance the
competing needs of public disclosure and the right to privacy. As such, the scope of the law is
limited to securities held by institutional investors and thus a significant proportion of the
institutional investor’s portfolio is opaque to researchers using 13F data.
With regards to the role of space and institutional investment, there is a significant gap in
the literature in recent years, especially from a Geography-centred point of view. That being
said, there is a rich peripheral literature that can be used to draw insights from various
disciplines as well as using more dated literature that is more directly applicable to the topic at
hand. More specifically, empirical data looking at foreign investment by mutual fund
managers and institutional investment managers investing abroad show non-trivial
associations between performance and distance from the market.
Within this literature, there is a dearth of studies comparing Canadian institutional investors
to their counterparts in the United States and around the world with the notable exception of
studies comparing Canadian and American banking systems. The literature appears to form a
consensus around the notion that the adoption of the “branch banking” model of regulation in
Canada allowed Canadian banks to take advantage of agglomeration economies by clustering
their headquarters in Toronto’s financial district, whereas American banks are more diffuse
thanks to their state banking model. These differences between the Canadian and American
banking sectors offer preliminary evidence that there are differences the two national systems
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of institutional investors.
Chapter 3
The data
This chapter examines the various sources of data, as well as how they are wrangled into a
format suitable for data analysis. Furthermore, this section explains how mundane data can be
transformed into spatially aware data using GIS techniques.
3.1 13F
The primary data for this survey of Canadian institutional investment is the information that
was self-reported by institutional investors 13F form, collected by the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission’s Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system
(EDGAR) service. While the data is available in a raw text format directly from the EDGAR
database, the data is in a semi-structured format that makes importing data into a database
problematic. The data used in this thesis was bought in a parsed format from
Whalewisdom.com (2011). In order to maintain accuracy, 30 filings from a representative size
distribution were randomly inspected and compared to the EDGAR database and no
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discernible errors were found.
The current Securities and Exchange Act (USC 15 §78a) directs the SEC to collect and
disseminate the holdings of institutional investors that have at least 100 million USD in
eligible securities1. Furthermore, if a manager exceeds the reporting threshold at the end of a
quarter, the manager must file quarterly reports for one year following the last report that
exceeded the reporting threshold. That being said, a fund manager may also choose to
voluntarily report the fund’s holdings, and thus help fill out the lower end of the distribution.
While this may represent sampling issues, it is relatively certain that the dataset covers the
entire top end of the distribution. Conversely, the bottom end of the distribution may pose
some problems with regards to coverage, especially since poorly performing institutional
investors have less of an incentive to self-report than strongly performing funds with low
capitalization. This should have a limited effect on the aggregate values used in this thesis,
since the top five Canadian funds represent just over 40% of all Canadian Institutional
Holdings reported under section 13F, and the top 20 accounts for just under 80% of the
Canadian total.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, as well as in Botts and Patterson (1987) in-depth
look at the State of Wisconsin Investment Board (SWIB), the main limitation of using 13F
reports for investigating institutional investors is that the scope of the reports exclude many
1The act permits the SEC to set the reporting threshold as no higher than 100 million USD and no lower as
10 million USD. As of 2014 the SEC has not exercised this authority and the reporting threshold remains at 100
million USD. However it should be noted that this threshold is not indexed to inflation, and thus while nominally
identical to the 1978 threshold, inflation has lowered the limit in real terms.
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important asset classes that are part of a diversified investment portfolio such as but not
limited to real estate, commodities, futures, structured investment vehicles, investment grade
art, etc. Nevertheless, these assets are peripheral to the main question of whether there is a
geographical relationship between institution investors and the firms in which they invest.
A limitation of the data that must be noted is that fund managers may ask for a
confidential treatment exemption under 13(f)(3) for matters of public interest or for protection
of the investor. The rationale behind this exemption is to prevent wild swings in pricing of a
security as a result of a manager’s strategy being prematurely disclosed, and report the
information publicly a few months later when the disclosure would cause less volatility in the
market (United States Securities and Exchange Commisssion 2013). Since the dataset dates to
mid-2011, it is possible that some of the positions are still confidential; however as per SEC
policy, these exemptions are rare and of limited duration, and thus should not unduly affect
this study.
The biggest limitation of this dataset for surveying the landscape of Canadian institutional
investment is that the data only relates to securities that are traded on American stock
exchanges and also have managers that use methods of American interstate commerce2.
2Section 2 (1)(a) of the Act requires that all transactions of securities that “...are effected by means of the mails
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce” fall under the purview of the Act. American jurisprudence has a
broad interpretation of what constitutes instrumentalities of inter-state commerce for the purposes of the Act, and
have defined it to cover not only commerce, communications and transport from any state to any location outside
of the state, be it domestic, foreign or in international waters. Furthermore, the use of “means of instruments
of interstate commerce”, such as but not limited to use of telephones, telegrams and mail, need not be directly
involved in the inter-state commerce in order to trigger the reporting requirements of the law. The courts have
clarified that use of these methods, even in a purely incidental, intra-state capacity, fall under the act if they have
the capability of interstate use. The United States Circuit of Appeal found in United States v. MacEwan, 455
F.3d 237, 245 (3rd Cir. 2006) that “the Internet is an instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce.”, and
the First Circuit found in United States v. Lewis, 554 F.3d 208, 215 (1rst Cir. 2009) that a computer connected
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Therefore this dataset excludes all securities that are traded on in the different Canadian stock
exchanges, as well as securities that are traded in foreign countries other than the United
States.
Lastly, by only requiring the reporting of all securities held at the close of the last day of
trading every quarter, this gives at most four ‘snapshots’ into the holdings of an institutional
investor3. Therefore, this omits the name and quantity of stocks held in between reporting
periods. As an example, if an institutional investor were to buy a stock on the first day of the
reporting quarter and sell it half a second before the end of the quarter, that position is not
recorded on the 13F form. Furthermore, as was demonstrated by the Bernie Madoff ponzi-
scheme scandal, securities that are listed on the quarterly reports are not necessarily reflective
of reality. Prior to his arrest and conviction for fraud and other ancillary crimes, the highly
secretive Mr. Madoff would fill out his 13F disclosure form with a very high proportion of
stocks from outside the S&P 100 and the S&P 500. When pressed about why the stocks that
would be expected from his announced strategy are conspicuously absent from his 13F filing
and that unexpected stocks are present, Mr. Madoff would reply that he would cash out his
position as well as buying other stocks at the end of each quarter to obfuscate his methods
(Gregoriou and L’Habitant 2009). In his admission of guilt during his hearing, Mr. Madoff
admitted that the funds “invested” into his fund never left his Chase Manhattan bank account
(United States District Court of Southern District of New York 2009). During the congressional
to the Internet was part “a system that is inexorably intertwined with interstate commerce” (Riley, Melloy, and
Shepherd 2007). Therefore it is a reasonable assumption that any investor with an instrument of business such as a
computer or a smartphone that has Internet access is covered by the act and ensures that for all practical purposes,
all institutional investors must report their holdings under section 13F of the SEA 1934.
3This is contrary to the practise of Mutual Funds in which must report daily on the performance of their fund.
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investigation into the Madoff scandal, certified fraud examiner (CFE) Harry Marcopolos noted
that in his professional opinion, many of the SEC’s auditing procedures were relatively easy to
circumvent4.
When it comes to high frequency traders (HFT) — firms that specialize in trading as close
to the speed of light as possible — holding time is measured in fractions of microseconds.
Since short term holdings are almost always pure arbitrage opportunities and thus rarely, if
ever, hold the stock long enough to exercise any voting rights, they fall outside of the scope of
this thesis.
3.2 Firm Data
There is an extensive emerging literature ((Bollen and Pool 2009), (Cici, Kempf, and Peutz
2010),(Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik 2011), (Ben-David, Franzoni, Landier, and Moussawi
2013) and (Cici, Kempf, and Peutz 2013)) showing that the self-reported securities value in
the 13F report can be misleading since the current SEC rules permits the investor of record to
mark securities at the price at which he or she feels is fair. However, while this discretion may
offer a fairer value for thinly traded securities, it has been shown by the above authors that
poorly performing hedge funds may temporary inflate the value of their holdings during
reporting day and subsequently mark-down those securities the next day. In order to get a
more objective and consistent value for each position, the CSUIP of each position is merged
4The main difficulty that Markopolos notes would be in keeping a second set of “pristine” books that are
synchronized with official filings to the SEC. See pages 43-47 of the February 9th 2009 testimony.
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with the closing price of each stock for December 31, 2010 using Capital IQ’s COMPUSTAT
database. The COMPUSTAT data gives the newly merged database the stock’s closing price
on the NYSE, the headquarter’s location, the earnings per share, the industrial classification
and a short description of the underlying company.
3.3 Database Management
Using the shared information column from the COMPUSTAT database, companies undergoing
orderly liquidation, investment holding companies, shell companies and investment trusts are
dropped from the database since the underlying companies are not actual productive businesses.
In the same vein, second order financial vehicles, more specifically exchange traded funds
(ETF)5 are also dropped from the database.
3.4 Locational Data
Using the addresses from 13F filings the institutional investors are geocoded using Esri’s
on-line rooftop geocoder version 10.3.6 Furthermore, all child accounts are consolidated into
the parent investment company since this is where the final corporate responsibility and
decision making takes place. This is consistent with the long geographic literature on the
subject, and the argument is well represented in Brunn and Leinbach (1991) as well as Green
(1993). They make the argument that even in the modern telecommunications era,
5An exchange traded fund is a recent financial innovation that permits an investor to track a certain basket
of goods in a manner similar to an index mutual fund. Unlike a mutual funds an ETF has many properties of
securities, and therefore can be traded at any time on an exchange rather than at fixed times as with closed ended
mutual funds or a the end of a trading day like an open ended mutual fund. (Fevurly 2013)
6The geocoding algorithm places a point feature at the geographical centre of the building’s roof and assumes
that the building is two dimensional.
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headquarters location leave an indelible mark on the company’s management, and that a
headquarters leaves its mark on a geographically diverse business operation.
3.5 Conclusions
Despite Canada’s lack of domestic institutional investment reporting requirements, the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission’s 13F offers a powerful, if limited tool for
researching institutional investment in Canada and around the world in addition to the United
States of America. However, joining the 13F reports with information about the company in
which institutional investors own securities, makes the database more powerful since it
contains important information on both parties. Finally, by running the complete database
though an address locator program, the data takes on the spatial properties of the headquarters
of both investors and public companies, and thus in a format suitable for spatial analysis.
Chapter 4
The Countries
This chapter examines spatial autocorrelation in the data as well as performing various
cross-country comparisons such as investigating the size distribution of investors in each
country in addition to analyzing certain macro-level investment distributions of investor
choices. The last section builds on the comparison of Canadian and American banks by
looking at the level of cross-ownership of the Big 5 Canadian Banks and the 8 Too Big to Fail
(TBTF) American banks.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the 13F disclosure is an American law. As such,
American firms are over-represented in the database. In fact, Table 4.1 indicates that
American institutional investors account for 87% of all 13F assets as well as 91% of
institutional investors in the database1. Furthermore, Figure 4.1 demonstrates that all
institutional investors are somewhat spatially concentrated, since with the notable exception
1In Table 4.1, the assets of institutional investors for United Kingdom Crown Dependencies are tabulated
separately from the total for the UK.
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of those in Sydney, Australia, are located in the Northern Hemisphere.
4.1 Spatial Autocorrelation
“Everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related than distant things.”
(Tobler 1970, p.236)
Spatial autocorrelation is the correlation between values over space. There are multiple
methods for determining if this phenomenon is present in a dataset, such as Moran’s I and
Gerry’s Ratio C. However, because of the more balanced distribution of its test statistic,
Moran’s I is the most used method of the two (Cliff and Ord 1973; Cliff and Ord 1981) A way
to describe the use of Moran’s I would be in the following example: If we take a chess board
and assign a value of 1 for black squares and a value of 0 for white squares, the Moran’s I
value would be -1 since the values are perfectly dispersed over space. Conversely, if all of the
white squares are moved to the left side of the board and all the black squares are moved to
the right side, the Moran’s I value would be 1 since the values are perfectly segregated. That
being said, real life is not that black and white and the null hypothesis indicates that there is
no meaningful autocorrelation in a dataset.
The paper Green, O’Hagan, and Lefebvre (2014) shows that there is no spatial
autocorrelation at the national level for US-based institutional investors. Investigating whether
there is significant autocorrelation at the global level, or within Canada falls outside the scope
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Country Number of Total Funds Under
Institutional Investors Management in USD
USA 2721 $11,455,327
Canada 76 $506,682
United Kingdom 82 $488,339
Cayman Islands 11 $58,794
Bermuda 2 $8,283
Guernsey 2 $4,444
Jersey 4 $1,286
Isle of Man 2 $286
British Virgin Islands 1 52
Total Crown
Dependencies and
Oversees Territories
22 73,145
Switzerland 8 156,922
Germany 4 142,236
Japan 25 99,610
Norway 5 88,250
Netherlands 9 79,619
France 7 48,879
Belgium 2 12,156
Australia 4 10,727
Ireland 6 9,342
Denmark 2 8,633
South Korea 1 4,982
Bahamas 2 1,245
Singapore 3 951
Peru 1 274
Sweden 1 273
Cyprus 1 146
Sweden 1 273
Hong Kong 2 47
Israel 1 0.2
Table 4.1: Total institutional investment assets by country as well as total number of
institutional investors by country in millions of USD
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Moran’s I z-score p-value
World-wide Assets under management 0.00 -0.85 0.39
World-wide Weighted EPS -0.02 -0.43 0.67
Canada Assets Under Management 0.00 -0.81 0.42
Canada Weighted EPS -0.02 -0.43 0.67
Table 4.2: Measures of Spatial Autocorrelation using Moran’s I
of that paper. This attempts to extend the literature in order to cover new ground.
As with Green, O’Hagan, and Lefebvre (2014), the principle metric used for analyzing
the efficiency of invested capital will be the weighted earnings per share. As demonstrated in
equation 4.1, the weighted earnings per share is calculated by aggregating the weighting the
earnings per share times the number of shares held in the position divided by the total number
of shares held by the institutional investor.
WeightedEPS =
∑
i Earnings per share j ∗ # o f sharesi j∑
i shares held by Institutional Investor
(4.1)
The other metric used to estimate the degree of autocorrelation between institutional
investors is to examine the total assets under management by each firm. This is calculated by
multiplying the number of shares reported by the closing price of the share according to the
COMPUSTAT and aggregating all of the resulting values for each investor.
Table 4.2 shows that on a global scale and for Canada, there is no spatial autocorrelation
between investors. This result is congruent with Green, O’Hagan, and Lefebvre (2014) since it
should be impossible to profit simply from the location of one’s peers.
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4.2 GINI Coefficient
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Figure 4.2: GINI Coefficient Plot of Distribution of Invested Assets by Country.
There are many ways to measure the statistical dispersion within a dataset — or subset as
the case may be — such as Atkinson’s measure and Kolm’s measure. However, the best
known measure of inequality in the social sciences is the GINI coefficient (Zeileis 2013).
Quite simply, this is the geometric interpretation of two times the area between the Lorenz
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curve of the distribution and a forty five degree diagonal. Considering the geometrical
properties of the coefficient, it is not surprising that a value of 0 represents perfect equality
since the Lorenz curve matches the diagonal, while a value of 1 represents perfect inequality
since the Lorenz curve is as far as geometrically possible from the diagonal (Lerman and
Yitzhaki 1984).
Figure 4.2 indicates that of the countries containing 25 or more institutional investors, the
USA has the most unequal distribution of funds with a GINI coefficient of 0.905 (n=2721),
followed by the UK at 0.819 (n=82), Canada at 0.696 (n=73) and Japan at 0.681 (n=25).
Looking at these GINI coefficients on their own may lead one to conclude that Canadian and
Japanese funds are clustered around the same values and that is true to a certain extent. On the
other hand, considering that 19 of the top 20 institutional investors by assets under
management are in the United States, one could be led to assume that the average US
institutional investors would be larger than their foreign counterparts. A glance at figures 4.3,
4.4 and 4.5, as well as table 4.3 show that contrary to expectations, the average American
company, as well as the median American company are smaller than their foreign
competitors. Therefore, as suggested by Tesar and Werner (1995) and Van Niewwerburgh and
Veldkamp (2009), one would have to presume that a foreign investor would need to reach a
critical size before one could profitably venture into the US market. Furthermore, it is not
unreasonable to assume that smaller foreign investors would either invest domestically or
would invest in the US market via a fund of funds arrangement. As discussed in the previous
chapter, such an arrangement would not show up in a 13F disclosure since the statutes do not
require fund managers to reveal the source of their capital.
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Median Assets Average Assets
Country Under Management Under Management
USA $294 $3,788
United Kingdom $709 $5,993
Japan $1,425 $3,984
Canada $2,542 $6,618
Table 4.3: Median and average assets under management per institutional investor by country
in millions USD
4.3 The Role of Relationship Between Investor Size and
Investment Target Size
In order to get a better idea of an initial geographical specialization of institutional investors,
this thesis looks at whether different countries have different preferences for the size of the
companies in which they invest. The metric used to measure the size of the company is the
company’s market capitalization (cap), which is calculated by multiplying the number of
outstanding stock of a company by its share price. In this case, the null hypothesis indicates
that there is no geographical specialization, since the ubiquity of information makes it
possible to effectively collect and interpret information, irrespective of one’s location.
Conversely, if the hypothesis is true, it is safe to say that the geographical proximity makes
the collection of information about firms more efficient. One would expect that investors in
countries outside of the United States are less likely to invest in smaller companies since
information on them is less prominent — even in an era of social media.
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Mega capitalization companies (market value greater than 100 billion) are often seen as
safe investments, but are often perceived as lacking in explosive growth opportunities. It
should be expected that these companies should show a large home-market bias despite also
being some of the companies where information may be easiest to acquire. One must expect
that easily acquired information would have a very short usable lifetime since many other
investors are trying to gain advantage from the information.
In order to control for different investment patterns by institutional investors based in a
country without a top-20 stock exchange2, in comparison to countries that have a more robust
home market such as Canada3, the countries with a top 20 stock exchange are coded with a
different variable than those without one (The World Federation of Exchanges 2010).
For the purposes of this test, the firms are categorized by market capitalization according
to the criteria set out by Taulli (2004).
• NanoCap = Market Capitalization of less than or equal to $50 million USD
• MicroCap = Market Capitalization of more than $50 million USD, but less than or equal
to 300 million USD
• SmallCap = Market Capitalization of more than $300 million USD, but less than or equal
to $2 billion USD
• MidCap = Market Capitalization of more than $2 billion USD, but less than or equal to
2by total market capitalization
3Home to Toronto’s TSX
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$10 billion USD
• LargeCap = Market Capitalization of more than $10 billion USD, but less than or equal
to $100 billion USD
• MegaCap = Market Capitalization of more than $100 billion USD
4.3.1 Median Polish
As explained by Tukey (1977), Hoaglin et al. (1983) and Hoaglin et al. (1985), the median
polish method is a simple method for analyzing data. It has many attributes that recommend
it’s use for exploring data and identifying areas of further study, such as it’s conceptual
simplicity, resistance to errors as well as outliers. However, a major drawback is that median
polishes are not particularly useful for hypothesis testing since the result does not give a
p-value.
General Additive Model
yi j = µ + αi + β j + i j (4.2)
In formal equation 4.245, a median polish is an additive fit model, in which each cell is
calculated as follows: (yi j) represents the raw numbers in the table, (µ) represents the table
effect (also known in the literature as the table constant), (α) represents the contribution of the
row effect, (β) represents the column effect and finally () represents the residual. The residual
4It should also be noted that (Hoaglin, Mosteller, and Tukey 1983) wrote the equation as the following yi j =
m + ai + b j + ei j
5For detailed information on how to solve the equation, please refer to page 171 of (Hoaglin, Mosteller, and
Tukey 1983)
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represents the divergence of the cell from the expression of µ + αi + β j.
These values are calculated in the following way:
1. Calculate the median for each row and store these values as the row effect. 6
2. Subtract row effect from the cells in the corresponding row.
3. Calculate the median of the row effects, and add this value to the table effect.
4. Calculate the median for each column and store these values as the column effect.
5. Subtract the row effect from each cell in the corresponding cell in the table
6. Calculate the median of the column effects and add this value to the table effect
7. Reiterate steps 1 trough 6 until the change in each iteration is below a predetermined
threshold or a set number of iterations are completed7.
Solving for Epsilon
i j = yi j − (µ + ai + β j) (4.3)
As per Hoaglin, Mosteller, and Tukey (1983), one can solve for any one of the 4 terms,
and each solution gives a different perspective into the data. In this case, µ would give us
the median value of the table, α indicates how much capital is invested in the other selected
6According to (Hoaglin, Mosteller, and Tukey 1983), convention dictates that the row median is the first step
of the process, however the analysis can be done by calculating the columns first. That being said, the results from
a columns-first median polish will differ in sum of absolute residuals (SAR) from a row-first median polish. The
differences lies mainly in the realm of pure mathematics and are of negligible importance on the final analysis
7Throughout this project, the default change threshold is 0.001 and the maximum number of iterations is
1000. No algorithm reached the maximum number of iterations.
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banks relative to the other banks on the same axis, β indicates how much capital is invested
in that bank, and finally  indicates how well the model over or underestimates an investment
relationship. Equations 4.2 shows that the terms µ, α and β are derived from the median, and
thus are not unduly influenced by missing values unlike a χ2 analysis.
4.3.2 Using the Median Polish to Analyze Investment Distribution
χ2 df p-value
ROW Without Stock Exchange 1707 5 0
ROW With Stock Exchange 582 5 0
Canada 477 5 0
Table 4.4: Comparing the aggregate number of position of institutional investors outside of
the United States by the market cap of the investment against the American distribution of
positions using a χ2 test.
NanoCap MicroCap SmallCap MidCap LargeCap MegaCap
ROW Without Stock
Exchange
733 4492 14147 23597 18538 2284
Expected 670 4893 17021 20152 17393 3663
ROW With Stock
Exchange
7 135 1356 2430 2182 314
Expected 67 493 1714 2029 1751 369
Canada 141 1446 5124 6872 7325 1111
Expected 231 1689 5875 6956 6003 1264
USA 6190 45545 158935 179692 155439 34932
Total 7071 51618 179562 212591 183484 38641
Table 4.5: Comparing the aggregate number of position of institutional investors outside of
the United States by the market cap of the investment against the American distribution of
positions using a χ2 test.
Exploring the data in table 4.6, some patters start to emerge. First and foremost, is that the
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Residuals: NanoCap MicroCap SmallCap MidCap LargeCap MegaCap
ROW Without Stock Exchagne -2721.2 -1494.2 1494.2 5345.2 2589.2 -2430.8
ROW With Stock Exchange 5126.8 2722.8 -2722.8 -7247.8 -5192.8 4173.2
Canada 2721.2 1494.2 -1494.2 -5345.2 -2589.2 2430.8
USA -86788.8 -49965.8 56758 71916 49966 -59307
NanoCap MicroCap SmallCap MidCap LargeCap MegaCap
Column Effects: -5865 -3333 3333 8932 6629 -4605
ROW Without ROW With
Stock Exchange Stock Exchange Canada USA
Row Effects: 3017 -5557 -3017 92542
Overall: 6302.25
Table 4.6: Investor Origins and Investment Capitalization Median Polish Results. All sums in
Millions USD
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United States of America dominates the dataset, supplying 93% of the data-points in the table.
Consistent with the assumption where information has cost and is time-sensitive, the
United States are over-represented in nano, micro, small and mega cap positions. Conversely,
they are under-represented in holdings in mid cap and large cap companies— due to the
effective competition by its foreign rivals. One could plausibly assume that these companies
would be in the “Goldilocks Zone” — large enough to make a decent return on investment,
yet small enough that there is less competition for information on the company.
In order to get a more quantitative look at the regional breakdown of investors and the size
of the company they are willing to invest in, a median polish analysis is used. In this case, the
median polish was used instead of a cross-tab analysis with χ2 since median polish is more
robust in the presence of extreme outliers (Hoaglin, Mosteller, and Tukey 1983). For example,
the number of investors in nano cap companies from countries without a top 20 stock
exchange is two orders of magnitude smaller than the next smallest value in Table 4.5.
Looking at the row effects, having access to a high calibre domestic stock exchange influences
the level of participation in the US stock market, for both Canadian investors and investors
with a top 20 stock exchange are under-represented. In contrast, countries without a top 20
stock market are over-represented in the data. As presented earlier, US-based investors are the
most over-represented region within the table due to being the home market of the 13F
disclosure law. This is consistent with the idea that a high quality domestic stock exchange
would vie for investors capital and thus divert them away from the US market.
The analysis in the data for Canadian-headquartered large cap businesses, shows that
Chapter 4. The Countries 55
Primary Secondary Tertiary Quaternary
Canada 5254 6007 3081 7553
Foreign 13819 50571 10599 25350
USA 112680 174982 86063 207008
Table 4.7: Total positions by Country of Institutional Investor and the Main Economic Sector
of the Investment. The Classification of Primary, Secondary, Tertiary and Quaternary was
established from the Global Industry Classification Standard Sub-Industry Classification. This
highly granular classification scheme was sorted by industry sector using the grid in appendix.
Canada Foreign USA Total
Canada 324 19 239 582
Foreign 61 91 1272 1425
USA 361 832 12268 13461
Total 746 949 13779 15468
Table 4.8: Total funds by country of institutional investor (y axis) and the country of the
headquarter of the investment (x axis). All funds are in billion USD
Canadian investors are more interested in investing in consumer staples, financial and
telecommunications stocks than energy or raw materials. In some ways, this is surprizing
considering that Canada is historically a resource based economy. However, this may be a
case of selection bias, since the TSX is primarily a natural resource based stock exchange and
these domestic investments would not show up on a 13F form unless the stock was dual-listed
and the institutional investor was accredited in both Canada and the US. A second line of
evidence for Canadian institutional investors favouring dual-listed stocks is the preponderance
of Canadian headquartered companies vs the practise of non-Canadian foreign based investors
overwhelmingly favouring American headquartered companies as seen in table 4.8.
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4.4 Comparing Canadian and American Banks
Looking at the tables 4.9 and 4.10, it becomes quickly apparent that there are three broad
grouping in the data: Canadian domestic linkages (dark red), US domestic linkages (dark
blue) and cross-border linkages (pastel colours). Furthermore, these groupings indicate that
domestic inter-ownership links are the most important category of ownership relationships —
as measured in both relative and absolute terms. The role of inter-ownership in banks is more
important within Canada than in the United States.
4.4.1 Patterns in the raw data
Distance patterns favour in-country ownership than cross-border ownership. This is not
surprising, since domestic ownership is largely independent from foreign exchange rate
changes8, as well as from regulatory limits.
For Canada, RBC has the highest cross-ownership stakes in absolute and relative terms and
CIBC has the lowest. On the other side of the border, only State Street approaches Canadian
level ownership stakes in other American banks.
4.4.2 Using Median Polish On Inter-Ownership Matrix
By examining tables 4.9 and 4.10, it is apparent that there are eight squares that have a zero
value. As such, this violates the assumptions of a more traditional approach to analyzing this
8Also known as FX risk, and currency risk.
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data such as χ2. Furthermore, median polish, unlike other methods of analysis such as χ2, the
residuals show where the data differs in important ways from what would be expected from a
naive model (Klawonn et al. 2013).
The median polish analysis was performed on two different, but related measures of bank
inter-ownership: Ownership stakes as measured in absolute amounts (Table 4.6) as well as in
terms of percentage of the total amount of common stock issued (Table 4.7). The first method
is useful for determining the total exposure of the bank in case of a drop in stock in the bank
they have invested in9. The second method examines the level of inter-bank ownership in
terms of effective control of the bank. Literature in the field of institutional ownership and
corporate voting patterns, such as Bethel and Gillan (2002) find that banks often side with
management during shareholder meetings. However, since banks usually account for a
non-trivial percentage of all shares issued, they must be taken into account while proposing
shareholder motions .
Examining the residuals of both models, they generally underestimate the value of same-
country investing as well as systematically overestimating the value of inter-country ownership.
However, it is interesting to note that the residuals over-shoot in different directions depending
on the model used. When looking at the table in dollar amounts rather than in ownership
stake, the median polish model overestimates the value of Canadian investment into US banks.
Conversely, due in part to their smaller market capitalization, the median polish overestimates
9This is precisely the nightmare scenario that followed the Lehman Brothers collapse in 2008, since a fall in
value of a bank’s trading book means that it has to either post a higher collateral in order to borrow short-term
from other banks, or sell-off assets at fire-sale prices in order to stay under a predetermined lending ratio (Smith
2010).
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the ownership stake of American banks in Canadian banks. In other words, the model shows
that the links between the Big 5 Canadian banks and the 8 TBTF banks reside principally
within national borders. Furthermore, since the table is symmetrical, it is possible to visualize
this finding via a the statistical technique of multidimensional scaling.
4.4.3 Multidimensional Scaling
A visual way to investigate the similarities or differences between investigated objects is via a
scatter-plot created by way of multidimensional scaling (MDS). This technique has a long
history in Geography, since it permits visualization of relationships into scatter-plot. For
example, an early use of this technique was to estimate Cartesian coordinations of unknown
locations from known distances (Shepard 1962a; Shepard 1962b). However, this visualization
of similarities and dissimilarities is not limited to finding lost locations, and is used by other
social scientists to find associations in data, as well as psychologists to “map” associations
between disparate notions and other types of relationships. As such, using MDS to visualize
the level of inter-ownership between the Big 5 Canadian banks and the 8 Too Big to Fail
(TBTF) banks in the United States shows the level of inter-dependence between these large
institutions. Clustering within the graph helps give insight into groupings of which banks are
highly inter-related.
Traditional MDS plots are created from an euclidean space using the square of the
distance between vectors, and therefore, the values are identical for similarities and
dissimilarity indices. Furthermore, since the results of a MDS analysis is contingent on a
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square contingency table without empty rows or columns, this analysis is primarily useful for
charting reciprocal relationships between different objects or actors. In this case, the
reciprocal relationship of cross ownership provides a square table that can easily be
transformed into a similarity matrix.
That being said, it may seem contradictory that at first glance that higher levels of
cross-ownership don’t necessarily raise the similarity score of each relationship if such levels
are abnormally high. However, multidimensional scaling measures how similar different
variables are, and as such, if a high level of cross-ownerships is abnormal, such an entity
would be shifted toward the periphery of the plot.
Even if Figure 4.8 does not have a national border, one could easily imagine one on the
x-axis zero — bifurcating the left side of the plot from the right side. In effect, all of the
Canadian Big 5 Banks have a negative x value, and all of the American TBTF banks have a
positive x-value. This result is consistent with the results of the median polish analyzing the
inter-ownership of the Canadian Big 5 banks in relation to the inter-ownership of the
American TBTF banks, and offers an important visualization of the difference.
4.5 Conclusions
Looking at the global distribution of Institutional investors by country, Canadian investors can
be sorted in the global hierarchy. As such, if taken in aggregate, Canadian investors as a whole
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are the largest block of institutional investors outside of the United States by aggregate assets
and the third largest block by number of investment firms. Furthermore, the distribution of data
within each country is constant with the theory that smaller investors will invest domestically
and that it takes a certain size before one invests abroad into the US market. This is further
strengthened by the observation of investors in countries without a high quality domestic stock
exchange act differently in terms of size distribution of the firm as well as their investment
preference when compared to investors who’s domestic market is well served. And lastly,
by comparing the inter-ownership structure of the Canadian Big 5 and American Too Big To
Fail institutions, it is apparent that intra-country ownerships stakes are relatively weak, and
that Canadian institutions have a much higher level of inter-ownership than their American
counterparts.
Chapter 5
Canadian Investment Flows
Previous literature such as Green and Meyer (1992), Green (1993), Green (1995) and Green,
O’Hagan, and Lefebvre (2014) examine the state of institutional investment within the United
States. Canada rarely benefits from such treatment, because it is a marginal player on the world
stage due to its smaller population and GDP compared to the first tier of financial services
countries such as the United States, United Kingdom and Japan. A further problem hampering
the examination of the landscape of Canadian investors is the lack of a national legislative
tool similar to the SEC’s 13F requirements due to the mixed constitutional jurisdiction. Due
to the large overlap of securities listed in both countries, the American 13F disclosure law
permits an imperfect, but useful first look at the layout of Canadian institutional investment by
location and flows of capital between provinces and cities. Furthermore, the 13F disclosures
offer the chance to examine whether Canadian investors show a penchant for specializing in
certain industries by comparing the aggregate of all portfolios in the country as well as in each
province against the global distribution with regards to economic sectors.
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5.1 Canada in Context
Table 5.1 shows that if Canadian provinces were treated the same way as American States or
the District of Columbia when calcualting the aggregate assets of investors, Ontario would rank
seventh out of 57, Quebec 17th and Alberta 44th. These rankings show Canada’s importance
as a source of institutional investor capital. It should be noted that the Canadian Atlantic
provinces1 are absent from such the list since they are devoid of any reported institutional
investor for this time period.
5.2 Inter-Provincial Investment
As indicated in Table 4.8, securities issued by Canadian headquartered companies held by
Canadian institutional investors account for over 320 billion USD out of a total of 580 billion
USD under management. This 320 billion USD is explored in further detail by breaking down
the data along provincial lines. Table 5.2 shows that the distribution of the data informs what
method of analysis is most appropriate. In this case, since the column for New Brunswick
contains multiple zeros within it, standard statistical tools for analysis of two-way tables such
as χ2 and Wilks’ λ (lambda) are not appropriate for this analysis. Therefore, a median polish
analysis is used to glean a prima facie look at inter-provincial flows of investment capital.
As previously explained in Chapter 4, median polish is an additive fit model composed of
table median + row effect + column effect. In this case, the constant value that gives the
lowest absolute residuals in the table is 2.1 billion USD. As explained in section 6F of
1New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Labradore and Prince Edward Island
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Rank State/Province Total Assets Rank State/Province Total Assets
1 New York $3,101,254 30 Iowa $29,185
2 California $2,316,446 31 Maine $24,644
3 Massachusetts $1,950,718 32 Kentucky $18,153
4 Illinois $1,248,972 33 New Mexico $18,042
5 Pennsylvania $899,502 34 Vermont $16,237
6 New Jersey $439,446 35 British Columbia $15,919
7 Ontario $386,404 36 Oregon $15,397
8 Connecticut $368,208 37 Saskatchewan $11,869
9 Maryland $365,887 38 Alabama $8,593
10 Minnesota $353,364 39 Indiana $7,895
11 Texas $334,907 40 Utah $7,106
12 Georgia $319,164 41 District of Columbia $5,526
13 North Carolina $265,427 42 Rhode Island $5,353
14 Colorado $250,121 43 Oklaholma $4,355
15 Ohio $137,189 44 Alberta $4,287
16 Wisconson $132,646 45 New Hampshire $3,902
17 Quebec $124,550 46 Louisiana $3,108
18 Washington $122,821 47 Alaska $2,647
19 Deleware $121,269 48 Montana $2,241
20 Missouri $118,615 49 South Carolina $2,186
21 Florida $93,764 50 Nevada $2,049
22 Arizona $60,801 51 Arkansas $2,015
23 Nebraska $57,981 52 West Verginia $1,683
24 Virgina $55,285 53 Hawaii $1,023
25 Kansas $53,081 54 Idaho $877
26 Michigan $46,855 55 North Dekota $393
27 Manitoba $42,804 56 South Dakota $261
28 Mississippi $32,115 57 Wyoming $102
29 Tennesee $31,916
Table 5.1: Aggregate Institutional Assets by State, District and Province. These numbers differ
from Green, O’Hagan, and Lefebvre (2014) since unlike that paper, these figures exclude non-
equities investments such as exchagne traded funds.
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Alberta British Columbia New Brunswick Nova Scotia
Alberta $1,188 $372 $0 $138
British Columbia $2,054 $789 $0 $423
Manitoba $8,233 $3,144 $0 $2,240
Ontario $54,121 $17,163 $0* $14,090
Quebec $23,566 $5,784 $0 $3,326
Saskatchewan $2,505 $1,699 $0. $636
Column Total $91,666 $28,952 $0* $20,852
Ontario Quebec Saskatchewan Row Total
Alberta $924 $284 $137 $3,043
British Columbia $3,142 $656 $435 $7,450
Manitoba $11,919 $2,669 $1,265 $29,471
Ontario $91,774 $20,773 $9,157 $207,079
Quebec $21,612 $6,024 $2,907 $63,219
Saskatchewan $3,558 $1,404 $552 $10,353
Column Total $132,930 $31,811 $14,453 $320,664
Table 5.2: Inter-provincial Matrix of Institutional Ownership
Rows represent the province in which the institutional investor is located, and the column
represent the province in which the company they invest in is located. All sums are in millions
of USD. * indicates a sum larger than zero.
Hoaglin, Mosteller, and Tukey (1983), the multiple zeros in the model have the effect of
lowering the table constant while increasing the importance of row and column effects.
The next step of a median polish analysis is to look at the row and column effects, since
these show how influential a variable is in influencing the table. Starting with the row effects,
the model classifies Ontario as the preferred province for institutional investment with Quebec
in second place. Among the provinces investing in Canada, Alberta is ranked last in
inter-provincial investments. This comes as no surprise, since there is only one institutional
investor located in Alberta that has Canadian investments: The Alberta Investment
Management Corporation (AIMCO).
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Britsh New Nova
Alberta Columbia Brunswick Scotia Ontario Quebec Saskatchewan
Alberta -2481 -22 1837 537 -5132 0 1066
British Columbia -2009 0 1,443 428 -3308 -22 970
Manitoba 2009 195 -717 85 3308 -170 -361
Ontario 33683 0 -14931 -2280 68949 3720 -6682
Quebec 14507 0.00 -3552 -1664 10166 350 -1553
Saskatchewan -2284 185 717 -85 -3619 0 361
Britsh New Nova
Alberta Columbia Brunswick Scotia Ontario Quebec Saskatchewan
Column Effects: 3385 110 -2122 -684 5772 0 -1213
Britsh New
Alberta Columbia Brunswick Ontario Quebec Saskatchewan
Row Effects -1837 -1443 717 14932 3552 -717
Table Effect 2,122
Table 5.3: Residuals of a median polish performed on Table 5.2
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When it comes to destinations for investments, Ontario is still the premier province for
receiving funds with a column effect of 5.7 billion USD. The second highest column effect, in
stark contrast to its paucity of institutional investors is Alberta with an effect of 3.4 billion
USD. Conversely, New Brunswick has the smallest column effect at -2.1 billion USD, and its
neighbouring maritime province of Nova Scotia is also showing a negative column effect at
-0.7 billion USD.
The residuals reveal what relationships are over and underestimated by the additive model.
In-spite of Ontario’s strongest row and column effects, these values grossly underestimate the
strength of this relationship, for the residuals are just under 69 billion USD. As predicted by
the column effects, the Ontario-Alberta relationship is also quite strong, while the Atlantic
provinces have a low level of investments.
With respect to the Quebec-Quebec relationship, the popular held belief is that Quebec
investors have a very strong home bias, due in part to Quebec nationalism and the policies of
the Caisse de Depot et Placement du Quebec (CDPQ). From its inception in 1963 by the
Lessage Government, the Caisse has a dual mandate to grow its capital via careful
investments as well as using that capital to help develop the Quebec economy by attracting
investments to the province (Savard 1993). Looking deeper in the CDPQ’s positions as
reported on their 13F filings, only 39 of their 695 equity positions are headquartered in
Canada, accounting for 9.1 billion USD out of 41.3 billion USD reported in the filings. Of all
of the CDPQ’s Canadian positions, only five firms are headquartered in the province of
Quebec which account for 685 million USD in equities. However, the 13F disclosures do not
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account for all equities investments since the report only discloses securities that are on the
SEC’s official list of 13F securities (United States Securities and Exchange Commisssion
2010). By reconciling the 13F figures with the totals in the CDPQ’s annual report, the 13F
eligible section of their portfolio represents a small fraction of their total equities investments.
For example, as of December 31, 2010, the CDPQ had an aggregate of 8.4 billion USD
invested in Quebec firms according to its annual report, of which only 685 million USD
showed up on the SEC report (Whalewisdom.com 2011).
Province Energy Materials Industrials Consumer Consumer
Discretionary Staple
Alberta 1300 980 360 170 100
British Columbia 2840 2530 1210 1080 801
Manitoba 9500 6280 2360 2290 1210
Ontario 72330 50830 25940 24990 12510
Quebec 30220 13850 8390 4700 3240
Saskatchewan 2020 170 700 1090 120
Grand Total 118210 77640 38960 34320 18000
Province Health Financials Information Telecomm- Utilities Grand
Care Technology unication Total
Alberta 150 740 270 150 60 4290
British Columbia 990 3440 2150 540 330 15920
Manitoba 1620 14120 3230 2060 130 42800
Ontario 23520 113160 44000 14430 4700 386400
Quebec 22170 23420 13380 4260 930 124550
Saskatchewan 420 2670 1080 610 0 11870
Grand Total 48870 157540 64100 22040 6150 585830
Table 5.4: Total Investments by Province and Investment Sector. All sums in million USD,
Categorizes created by GICS industry sorting.
As seen in table 5.2, Quebec’s primary sector investments are concentrated in the Oil and
Gas industry, and those investments are mostly headquartered in Alberta. Looking at the greater
dataset shows that the oil and gas companies headquartered in the American Gulf states are
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another important location for Quebec’s institutional investor holdings.
5.3 Inter-City Flows
Since 13F SEC filings mandate the disclosure of the city in which the head institutional
investor works, as well as having other filings via the COMPUSTAT database which discloses
the address of the companies being invested-in, this data is used to create a capital flow
matrix. This matrix provides a general idea as to where the major concentrations of
institutional investment capital is located within Canada.
As with the inter-provincial contingency table, some cells contain null values. While
median polish is robust to such occurrences, it is suggested that they be minimized where at
all possible (Hoaglin, Mosteller, and Tukey 1985). Therefore, for the analysis in this section,
cities are aggregated by their census metropolitan area (CMA). Figures 5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5,
5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 at the end of this chapter show that the vast majority of Canadian institutional
investors have a propensity to locate in the Central Business District (CBD), since Regina is
the only city where the institutional investor is outside the CBD (Map 5.9). That being said,
the location of the investor in Regina is undeniably in an urban space.
Unlike the inter-provincial investment matrix in the previous section, the extra variables in
the inter-city investment matrix in Table 5.8 means that the table effect will be weaker (2.1
billion USD vs. 243.2 million USD). Conversely, the row and column effects will be much
stronger. Since Toronto is the biggest component of the Ontario variable in the
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inter-provincial investment matrix, it comes as no surprise that the city of Toronto has the
largest effect of all the rows and columns.
In many ways, several trends observable in section 5.2 are still in table 5.7. However there
are some changes that are only observable at the lower level of data, such as Calgary is the
only institutional investor at the time of this study having a portfolio devoid of Canadian
headquartered companies. A second difference that is observable in the city level data is the
stark difference between Toronto and London in Ontario since there is a difference of 3.2
billion USD in row effect. In fact, is should be noted that London has a negative row effect,
indicating that it has a much lower level of investment than its peers on the table rows when
taking into account the relative propensity for investors to invest in the selected cities. This is
not surprising considering that London, Ontario only has one institutional investor versus
Toronto’s 53 investors.
Unlike the rows, the columns of the inter-city table have several more cities that than
provinces analyzed during the inter-provincial flow median polish. Table 5.7 indicates which
Canadian cities receive investment money: Ontario contains five cities (Cambridge, Guelph,
Ottawa, Toronto and Waterloo), Quebec2 contains three cities receiving investment money
(Montreal, Quebec City and Rouyn-Noranda) and Alberta has two (Calgary and Edmonton).
Looking at the column effects in figure 5.8, these cities are divided into 4 groups using the
2Kingsly Falls, Quebec accounts for 0.24 millions USD, well below the 5 million USD cutoff for the median
polish table.
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Jenks-Fisher sorting algorithm (Bivand 2013). This method is used to sort Canadian cities into
incoming investment hierarchy. The first group, also known as the core, contains Toronto and
Calgary with column effects of over 2 billion USD. The second group, also known as the semi-
core, contains Vancouver and Montreal with column effects of 1.0 to 1.4 billion USD. The third
group, also known as the semi-periphery, comprise of Halifax, Saskatoon and Waterloo with
column effects of 243.2 to 384.0 million USD. The last group, also known as the periphery,
contains the remaining cities and have a column effect of -243.2 million USD.
City Canada-Canada Investments Total Investments
Calgary 0 391
Edmonton 2173 3896
London 2172 3370
Montreal 43894 124550
Regina 7204 11869
Toronto 155792 383033
Vancouver 5227 8791
Victoria 0* 7128
Winnipeg 18799 42804
Sum 235261 585833
Table 5.5: Total Canadian Institutional Investments by City. All sums in millions USD
* indicates a positive sum, but is rounded down to 0.
5.4 Sectoral Investments
One limitation to the median polish is that it is an inferior tool for testing a sample against a
known distribution. In this case a χ2 test is more apropriate. This section tests if investors
headquartered in Canada – a nation that has a historical reliance on resource extraction –
exhibits a bias in favour of these industries in its investment patterns.
Chapter 5. Canadian Investment Flows 76
City Canada-Canada Investments Total Investments
Calgary, AB 92477 190643
Cambridge, ON 1 13
Dartmouth, NS 0 0*
Edmonton, AB 17 175
Guelph, ON 109 350
Halifax, NS 20722 32637
Kingsey Falls, QC 0 0*
Moncton, NB 0* 0*
Montreal, QC 32398 71204
Ottawa, ON 60 789
Quebec City, QC 94 147
Regina, SK 71 78
Rouyn-Noranda, QC 7 25
Saskatoon, SK 14570 46204
Stellarton, NS 1 2
Thunder Bay, ON 0 1
Toronto, ON 125855 249570
Val d’Or, QC 0* 0*
Vancouver, BC 30863 128244
Victoria, BC 0* 4
Waterloo, ON 10229 25906
Whitehorse, YK 0 106
Winnipeg, MB 69 115
Grand Total 327549.00 746357.58
Table 5.6: List of Canadian Cities by Aggregate Investments from Institutional Investors. All
sums in millions USD. * indicates a positive sum, but is rounded down to 0.
Chapter 5. Canadian Investment Flows 77
Quebec
City Calgary Edmonton Guelph Halifax Montreal Ottawa City
Edmonton 1182 0 0 135 284 2 0
London 681 0 0 237 227 0* 0
Montreal 23535 0* 0 3284 6058 20 23
Regina 2501 0 0 627 1403 0 0
Toronto 54255 14 109 13809 21107 38 59
Vancouver 2052 0 0 418 651 0 8
Winnipeg 8271 1 0 2211 2667 0 4
Total 92477 16 109 20722 32398 60 94
Rouyn-
City Regina Noranda Saskatoon Toronto Vancouver Waterloo Winnipeg
Edmonton 0 0 137 866 380 64 0
London 0 0 260 1235 450 105 0
Montreal 10 4 2900 19780 6076 2133 47
Regina 0 0 552 3112 1710 486 0
Toronto 62 3 9023 86578 18252 6520 20
Vancouver 0 0 435 2894 851 252 0
Winnipeg 0 0 1264 11390 3145 668 2
Total 71 7 14570 125855 30863 10229 69
Edmonton London Montreal Regina Toronto Vancouver Winnipeg
Row Totals 3050 3194 63872 10393 209851 7561 29623
Table 5.7: Inter-City Matrix of Institutional Ownership
Rows represent the province in which the institutional investor is located, and the column
represent the province in which the company they invest in is located. The cities of Moncton,
Victoria and Stellarton are omitted from the columns and the city of Victoria is omitted from
the rows because the total investment in those cities were less than 1 million dollars. All sums
are in millions of USD
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Quebec
Calgary Edmonton Guelph Halifax Montreal Ottawa City
Edmonton -1112 207 207 -284 -772 209 207
London -1675 146 146 -244 -878 146 146
Montreal 20187 -847 -847 1810 3426 -827 -824
Regina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Toronto 48682 -3057 -2962 10110 16354 -3033 -3012
Vancouver -391 58 58 -151 -599 58 66
Winnipeg 5677 -92 -923 1491 1214 -93 -89
Rouyn-
Regina Noranda Saskatoon Toronto Vancouver Waterloo Winnipeg
Edmonton 207 207 -207 -2039 -1123 -215 207
London 146 146 -146 -1732 -1114 -236 146
Montreal -837 -843 1501 15821 3519 800 -800
Regina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Toronto -30010 -3069 5399 80394 13470 2962 -3051
Vancouver 58 58 -58 -160 -800 -176 58
Winnipeg -93 -93 619 8185 1342 89 -91
Quebec
Calgary Edmonton Guelph Halifax Montreal Ottawa City
Column Effect 2258 -243 -243 384 1007 -243 -243
Rouyn-
Regina Noranda Saskatoon Toronto Vancouver Waterloo Winnipeg
Column Effect -243 -243 308 2869 1467 243 -243
Edmonton London Montreal Regina Toronto Vancouver Winnipeg
Row Effect -207 -146 847 0 3071 -58 93
Table Effect 243
Table 5.8: Residuals of a median polish performed on Table 5.7
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5.4.1 Sectors
In order to answer the question whether Canadian investors are biased toward certain industries,
a classification scheme is imposed. The COMPUSTAT data offers a categorization scheme in
the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) by MSCI-Berra and Standard & Poors
(MSCI-Barra 2010). This scheme gives each company an 8 digit code corresponding to their
principle business area. This code offers a high level of granularity when sorting companies
amongst 10 sectors, 24 industry groups, 68 industries and 154 sub-industries. However, this
classification scheme can mask one of Simon Kuznets’ great insights that:
“The three major sectors do differ significantly from each other-in the use of
natural resources, in the scale of operation of the productive units common to
each, in the production process in which they engage, in the final products that
they contribute, and in the trends in their shares in total output and resources
used.” (Kuznets 1973, p.87)
In essence, Kuznets divides the economy into three major sectors: the primary, secondary
and tertiary sectors. The primary sector comprises economic actors that gather raw materials
for further processing or sale to the end user. As such, this category contains but is not limited
to commercial fishing, agriculture, forestry, mining as well as oil and gas extraction. The
secondary sector (often called the manufacturing sector) comprises the transformation of
primary sector inputs into intermediate products for further manufacturing and/or finished
products. As such, the secondary sector essentially contains various refining and
manufacturing processes as well as construction. And finally, the tertiary sector (also known
as the service sector) produces intangible goods rather than end products. These services
include transportation, retail, wholesale, hospitality and specialized skills such as pest control
and entertainment amongst a plethora of economic activities.
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The tertiary sector originally worked as a “catch-all” for all economic activities that were
not part of the primary and secondary sectors, and as long as the economy was primarily
focused on heavy industry and manufacturing, this was not really a problem. However, as the
Western World continues to transition toward a post-industrial/service economy, it becomes
imperative to further subdivide the tertiary sector into two other sectors. The first new such
sector – the quaternary sector – is comprised of highly technical services and is often
summarized as the knowledge economy. Economic activities that fall under this heading
contain information generation as well as its dissemination, research and development,
professional consulting, high finance and advanced health-care/biomedical devices. The fifth
sector - the quinary sector - is principally concerned with public administration and
government. As such, it falls outside the scope of this study (Selstad 1990; Kenessey 1987).
It is apparent from the above paragraphs, that either approach - the GICS or economic
sector3 - masks underlying information when aggregating data. For example, under the
sectoral approach, an oil and gas drilling and exploitation company falls under the primary
sector, an oil and gas refining company falls under secondary and an oil and gas storage and
transportation company falls under tertiary sector. An added benefit of this approach is better
coverage of horizontally integrated firms, such as industrial machining, that offers its services
across GICS sectors.
On the other hand, under the GISC classification system, all three firms from the previous
paragraph are classified as an energy sector company since the majority of their businesses are
3To identify what category each GICS sub-industry is binned, refer to appendix B.
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related to oil and gas production (MSCI-Barra 2010). As such, the main advantage of the
GICS approach is that it allows for less ambiguous treatment for vertically integrated firms.
Primary Secondary Tertiary Quaternary
Alberta 1950 520 1480 330
British Columbia 3410 940 2780 350
Manitoba 10730 3360 14480 890
Ontario 67260 24740 106950 8100
Quebec 25210 9600 25580 2780
Saskatchewan 4020 1730 3630 980
Canada 145650 98700 235570 105910
Rest of World 200270 345720 478250 400620
USA 1601.03 3409270 4511980 3938490
Grand Total 1945580 3853200 5224470 4444850
Table 5.9: Breakdown of Investment Sector by Province of Institutional Investor in million of
USD
5.4.2 Canada
Primary Secondary Tertiary Quaternary
Observed Count 1440 980 2330 1050
Expected Count 730 1470 1940 1670
Table 5.10: χ2 Goodness-of-fit test for Canadian investments by economic sector. χ2 squared
= 115.837, d f = 3, p-value < 0.05. All values in million of dollars USD
In order to test whether Canadian-based investment firms have a similar equities portfolio
as their global counterparts, the χ2 goodness-of-fit test is used to test whether the distribution
is distinguishable from what is expected as random variation within the population. This test
is a variant of the normal χ2 test. As such, the assumptions of the mundane test applies: 80%
of cells having an expected count of greater than five and all cells having an expected count of
.
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Based on this test, Table 5.10 shows that the distribution of investments in Canada is
skewed toward the primary and tertiary sectors, and is under represented in the secondary and
quaternary sector. In a similar vein, Table 5.11 shows that Canadian investments are
concentrated in the primary sector areas such energy and raw materials stocks as well as
having a large component of service sector stocks in the finance and telecommunications
sector stocks.
A general theme of Canadian developmental geography and industrial geography is the
peculiar Canadian institution of the branch-plant. This early Confederation-era institution
encouraged foreign corporations to open manufacturing plants in Canada as a way to
circumvent trade tariffs on foreign manufactured goods. One of the main side effects of this
practise was to dissuade Canadian based industrial entrepreneurship in favour of allocating
Canadian capital toward natural resource extraction – essentially a functional case of Dutch
disease (Laxer 1989). However, the practice of opening up branch-plants in Canada has
lessened over time, mostly due to the liberalization of trade practices – the eliminations of
tariffs – as well as the greater efficiency of global trade networks – making off-shoring in
lower wage countries commercially viable.
If Canadian investors were to invest in the parent company of their local branch-plant, this
position would not show in a Canadian-Canadian investment matrix. Nevertheless, such
position would still show up as being part of a secondary sector investment in the investment
distribution. Table 5.10 indicates that this does not appear to be the case. A competing
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hypothesis put forward by Macdonald (2007) argues that instead of suffering from Dutch
disease, Canada is merely riding the wave of a China-led commodities boom, and this boom
drove Canadian growth from 2003-2008.
Ontario
Primary Secondary Tertiary Quaternary
Observed Count∗ 88559 65104 166312 63059
Expected Count 48178 97037 127751 110067
Table 5.12: Chi Square goodness-of-fit test for Ontario institutional investments by economic
sector.
∗ indicates significance at the 0.001 level. All values in million USD
Based on the observations of Table 5.12, Ontario has a high concentration of primary and
tertiary investments, as well as lower than expected levels of investments in secondary and
quaternary sectors.
This phenomenon can be explained in part by the presence of the Toronto Stock Exchange
(TSX) – the premier natural resource stock exchange in the world. As such, Ontario investors
have higher than expected investments in energy and raw materials stocks. Furthermore,
considering that the functional headquarters of the “Big 5” Canadian banks are in downtown
Toronto and that there is a very high level of cross-ownership between these banks, it is of no
surprise that retail banking is the leading component of tertiary sector stocks held by
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Ontarians.
Conversely, Ontario-based investors are under-represented in quaternary sector stocks
such as bio-medical and information technology compared to the global distribution. A
possible explanation for this shortfall is Research in Motion4. This company, which offers the
Blackberry smartphone, strattles the divide between telecomunications technology (tertiary)
and information technology(quaternary). This may also help to explain the high level of
tertiary investment in Ontario.
Quebec
Primary Secondary Tertiary Quaternary
Observed Count∗ 33436 21217 36544 33353
Expected Count 15666 31553 41540 35790
Table 5.13: Chi Square goodness-of-fit test for Quebec institutional investments by economic
sector.
∗indicates significance at the 0.001 level. All values in million USD
Looking at Table 5.13, Quebec’s investments in primary sector overshadows all three other
sectors relative to the expected counts. This is mainly attributed to the high level of oil and
gas investments by Quebec institutional investors, especially in Alberta and in the American
Gulf Coast states.
4The company changed its name to BlackBerry Ltd. in 2013
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In a similar vein to the CDEP, the annual report of Power Corperation of Canada lists its
total assets as 499.6 billion USD (Power Corperation of Canada 2011). However, the total
assets filed under the 13F disclosure system for the same time period in Appendix A.1
indicates, that Power Corporation of Canada only has 11 million USD of equities listed in
their 13F disclosure form. This is another reminder that the 13F disclosure law is an imperfect
tool since it does not compel the disclosure of privately held investments or of stocks held on
foreign exchanges.
Alberta
Primary Secondary Tertiary Quaternary
Observed Count ∗ 1955 522 1480 330
Expected Count 539 1086 1430 1232
Table 5.14: Chi Square goodness-of-fit test for Alberta institutional investments by economic
sector.
∗ indicates significance at the 0.001 level. All values in millions USD
Considering the contemporary natural resource boom, Alberta is heavily skewed in favour of
primary sector investment at the expense of secondary and quaternary investments. In fact,
Alberta is home to the top two Canadian Oil Fields – Athabasca Oil Sands and Western
Canada Oil Basin (Conti, Holtberg, Beamon, Napolitano, Schaal, Turnure, Westfall, and
Doman 2013). As such the majority of the investment in the primary sector from Alberta are
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in the form of the oil and gas.
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5.5 Conclusions
This initial survey of Canadian institutional investment for the fourth quarter of 2010
contextualizes Canada on a world stage, creates a snapshot of the location of Canadian
institutional investors and their investments and thus how much capital they have, as well as in
what economic sectors they prefer to weight they portfolio. As such, when comparing the
aggregate portfolios of institutional investors across Canada against the distribution of
investors world-wide, Canadian Investors show a preference for natural resource extraction
companies, and conversely they show a bias against investing in the manufacturing sector.
Chapter 6
The Cities
This chapter investigates the differences and similarities of institutional investors for the
Canadian cities of Montreal and Toronto as well as the American Cities of Chicago and New
York. These four cities make for interesting cross-border and inter-city comparisons for they
offer multiple ways of pairing up with each other1 2. However, the pairings that are most
informative are of first tier cities - Toronto and New York - as well as second tier cities -
Montreal and Chicago.
The choice of Chicago over Boston requires an explanation since, according to Green,
O’Hagan, and Lefebvre (2014) Boston is the city with the second most institutional
investments in the United States whereas Chicago is ranked sixth. Unlike Boston, Los
Angeles, Philadelphia and San Francisco, Chicago is a closer analogue of Montreal in terms
1Chicago-Toronto: Both of these cities are adjacent to the Great Lakes and were incorporated as political
entities in the 1830s.
2Montreal-New York: Both of these cities were incorporated prior to founding of their respective Countries
as well as being colonial era financial centres (although Montreal was a financial centre under British colonial
rule rather than French colonial rule).
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of population relative to the national urban hierarchy (2nd largest city vs 3rd largest city) as
well as more importantly hosting the location of a major trading platform for futures, options
and commodities (Montreal Exchange and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange). A further point
of comparison between the pairings of Montreal - Toronto and Chicago -New York is the
similar ratio in total assets (See Table 6.1).
This chapter looks at the investment portfolio distribution for each of the four selected cities
in order to discern if specialization due to local knowledge is detectable in the data. Secondly,
this chapter uses street address data from the 13F forms to determine if there is a pattern and if
so, whether the pattern can be explained by existing location theory.
6.1 Investor Size
From previous literature, such as Coval and Moskowitz (2001) and Green, O’Hagan, and
Lefebvre (2014), it has been demonstrated that institutional investors use tacit knowledge as a
form of comparative advantage in their trading strategy. Data analysis would provide insight
as to whether investors would favour certain industries over others.
6.1.1 Size
While Green et al. (2014) surveyed the total amount of institutional investment in the top
nine cities of North America3, as well as surveying the 33 largest institutional investors in
the 13F database, relatively little was done to see if there was any relationship between the
3Toronto is the only Canadian city on the list, coming in at number eight
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total assets under management in a city and the average size of the firms within that city. As
such, the question pondered is whether the national trend of Canadian investors having more
assets under management than their American based counterparts continues at the city level.
In order to answer this question, each institutional investor’s 13F portfolio was aggregated by
multiplying the total number of self-reported shares for each investment by the stock closing
price for the quarter by COMPUSTAT. It comes as no surprise in Table 6.1 that Montreal is the
city with the least total assets and that New York has the most, especially since Montreal is not
in the top 10 of Green et al. (2014). As shown in Figure 6.1 and Table 6.1, it is apparent that
investors in Montreal and Toronto have higher median assets than their counterparts in New
York and Chicago.
Number of Mean Median Total
City Institutional Investor Assets Assets Assets
Montreal 13 9.58 5.17 124.56
Toronto 49 7.23 1.66 383.03
Chicago 148 8.08 0.35 1195.83
New York 857 4.35 0.39 3730.23
Table 6.1: Summary of Institutional assets for Montreal, Toronto, Chicago and New York.
All assets in billion USD
Table 6.1 also shows that the distribution is more equitable in Montreal and Toronto since
their medians are closer to their average assets under management. Ideally, an ANOVA test is
the best statistical tool for determining whether the groups are statistically different from one
another. Unfortunately, this test requires that the samples all share a normal distribution and
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identical variances. With this sample, the assumptions needed for an ANOVA test cannot be
met (Levine’s test of homogeneity: 4.401, d f 1 = 3, d f = 2 p<0.004 ), and thus robust
methods will have to be used in analyzing whether the aggregate size of institutional investors
differs between cities. For this task, the appropriate non-parametric equivalent of the ANOVA
test is the Kruskal-Wallis test.
The Kruskal-Wallis test is similar to the better known Mann-Whitney U test4 in that it
compares rankings of ordered data. Just as with the Mann-Whitney U test, the data is ranked
from lowest to highest with no regard to the grouping variable. Once the data is ranked, the
lowest data-point is assigned a value of one, the second lowest ranked data-point is assigned a
value of two and so on until all of the data points are assigned a value. Once accomplished,
the rankings of each group are summed-up and used to calculated the H-value which is
compared on a χ2 distribution table. In the case at hand, the results of the test were:
Kruskal-Wallis χ2 = 23.5167, d f = 3, p − value<0.001.
4Also known under the names of Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW), Wilcoxon rank-sum test, or Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test.
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Comparisons obs.dif critical.dif difference
Chicago-Montreal 246.40 236.06 TRUE
Chicago-New York 9.15 72.64 FALSE
Chicago-Toronto 162.73 130.63 TRUE
Montreal-New York 255.56 228.04 TRUE
Montreal-Toronto 83.67 252.56 FALSE
New York-Toronto 171.89 115.50 TRUE
Table 6.2: Kruskal-Wallis test post hoc results for Montreal, Toronto, Chicago and New York.
Significance level: p = 0.05
While the Kruskal-Wallis test results indicate that there is a significant difference between
the rank orders of the four different cities; the test by itself does not indicate whether all or
just some of the city-city rank order differences are significantly different from one another.
Therefore, as with the ANOVA test, a post hoc test must be performed. In the case of a
Kruskal-Wallis test, the preferred method of wringing out relationships is to run what amounts
to a Mann-Whitney U test on each pair of cities. The results of the post hoc in Table 6.2 show
that cities within the same country are not statistically different in their size, but that each
cross-border pair is significantly different in size from one another. This is to be expected
considering that smaller institutional investors located in Canada would be more apt to invest
domestically where the barriers to entry are lower than investing abroad.
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6.1.2 Investment Distribution by Sector
As stated earlier, if a non-US based institutional investor decides to enter the US market, it
must have a competitive advantage over American domestic institutional investors. One such
advantage would be a larger pool of captial, since as seen in the previous section,
Canadian-based investors, as a group, are larger in Toronto and Montreal than
American-based investors. A certain threshold of available capital must be met before
eschewing domestic opportunities become feasible. A second plausible mechanism for
compensating for the disadvantage of being located outside of the United States is to
effectively target one’s investments into profitable opportunities via better investor research
and sectoral specialization. This section shows how the investment preferences for investors
located in each city differers from one another. Differentiation between cities should not come
as a surprise since each of these cities are host to either a major stock exchange (Toronto, New
York), mercantile exchange (Chicago) or futures exchange (Montreal).
According to Gray (2010), many echoes of the Staples Theory can be seen in the makeup
of the stocks listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE)5. Using the North American
Industry Classification System in order to identify all firms primarily in the forestry, oil and
gas, mining or finance sectors, the authors found that these firms account for 46.2% of firms
listed on the TSX and for 43.2% of the total market valuation. Using a similar criteria with the
GICS classification system yielded a total of 26.0% by company and 24.4% by market
valuation for the NYSE (n=1916) as well as 9.0% of companies and 5.1% by market
5That is to say that all ETFs, Big 5 Banks, foreign headquartered firms and trusts are removed from the subset
of data under analysis.
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valuation for the NASDAQ (n=2404).
Considering the heavy concentration of natural resource stocks in the TSX, it would be
interesting whether this leads to tacit knowledge in the industry and thus giving these
investors an edge in researching the best investments in the field. In order to answer this
question, all institutional holdings are sorted and binned into four categories based on their
GCIS code as done in chapter 5 and Appendix B. Afterwards, the holdings of all of the
institutional investors in each city are aggregated by bin6(See observed count in Table 6.3) and
then compared to the expected distribution by company sector using a χ2 goodness-of-fit test
based on all institutional investments for the 4th quarter of 2010.
As indicated in Table 6.3, the two Canadian cities are statistically different from total
institutional investment distribution whereas the two American cites are not. In particular,
investors in Montreal are heavily invested in natural resources at the expense of
under-investing relative to the global distribution in the manufacturing, service as well as the
high-tech and research sectors. However, institutional investors located in Toronto have in
aggregate a higher proportion of primary and tertiary sector investment at the expense of
investments in secondary and quaternary sector. Conversely, institutional investors located in
Chicago and New York City have a distribution of investments by sectors that are not
statistically different than the global distribution. By comparison, the data indicates that the
sectoral choices of investors in Montreal and Toronto are broadly representative of the
6Binning is a statistical technique used to reduce the number of variables to a manageable number by
aggregating larger numbers of low-frequency variables into a smaller number of broader variables. This
transformation does loose information, however the smaller number of variables facilitates analysis.
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Canadian distribution by sector. For instance, Table 6.4 shows that Montreal has a much lower
service sector distribution than the Canadian baseline, however this is compensated by a much
higher percentage of investment in the quaternary sector. As for comparing Toronto against
the national distribution, there is a slight, but not statistically significant difference from the
national baseline, in particular when it comes to the tertiary sector. However this should not
be surprising considering that Toronto accounts for nearly 70% of the Canadian institutional
investment.
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Primary Secondary Tertiary Quaternary
Montreal
Observed Count∗∗∗ 33 21 37 33
Expected Count 16 31 41 35
Toronto
Observed Count∗∗∗ 89 65 166 63
Expected Count 48 97 128 110
Chicago
Observed Count † 151 312 326 406
Expected Count 150 303 399 344
New York
Observed Count† 463 954 1200 1112
Expected Count 469 945 1244 1072
Table 6.3: Chi Square Goodness-of-Fit for Montreal, Toronto, Chicago and New York based
institutional investments by economic sector. The observed values are compared against the
distribution of all institutional investors for Q4 2010.
∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
† p > 0.1
All values in billions USD
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Primary Secondary Tertiary Quaternary
Montreal
Observed Count∗∗∗ 33 21 37 33
Expected Count 31 21 50 22
Toronto
Observed Count† 89 65 166 63
Expected Count 90 61 145 65
Table 6.4: Chi Square Goodness-of-Fit test for Montreal and Toronto-based institutional
investments by economic sector vs. the expected values of all Canadian holdings.
∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
† p > 0.1
All values in billions USD
6.2 Location
This section looks at the spatial distribution of the institutional investors within their city.
Prior research on the question of the spatial distribution of institutional investors was
conducted by Bodenman (1998), who showed that most investors were located either in the
central business district (CBD) or in the commuter suburbs and very few located in the zones
between them. As is evident from the maps in Figures 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 6.6, the observations
by Bodenman are partially correct for these cities since institutional investors are primarily
located in the central business district and the commuter suburbs. That being said, there are
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significant differences between 1993s Philadelphia and 2010s Montreal, Toronto, Chicago and
New York, such as the complete absence of suburban institutional investors in Montreal and
Toronto.
6.2.1 The Burgess Model
In the recent literature on urban planning, the Burgess model of concentric urban zones has
been criticized as being too centred on the lived experience of Eastern North America and
fundamentally unsuited for interpreting Western North American cities, especially Los
Angeles, as well as the rest of the world (Dear and Flusty 1998; Harris and Lewis 1998).
Since the four cities are located in North America and they reasonably fit the model, its use as
a descriptor of zones should not be problematic. The Burgess model, as shows in Figure 6.8,
is formed from concentric circles starting with the CBD in the centre (I), the factory zone (II),
zone of transition (III), working class zone (IV), residential zone (V) and commuter zone (VI)
Kearsley (1983).
Keeping in mind the Burgess model when looking at Figure 6.9, the presence of a
discontinuity between the centre of the town and the commuter zone for the two American
cities is visible suggesting that the intermediary zones are not propitious for institutional
investors. Whereas previous research (Bodenman 1998) demonstrated that Philadelphia’s
investors left the CBD in favor of the commuter suburbs of Valley Forge, Bala Cynwyd,
Wayne, Thorndale, Blue Bell or Yardley. Yet Montreal has a complete absence of institutional
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investors anywhere but the CBD and all of Toronto’s institutional investors fit comfortably
within the borders of pre-amalgamation Toronto (see Figure 6.3). This propensity for urban
location by Canadian investors is further reinforced by the fact that all institutional investors
are less than 1000m from the nearest subway stop. The absence of institutional investors from
the CBD is quite perplexing, however more research is needed to see if this is a temporal blip
in which investors did report from outside the central business district during a time-period
outside of this study (q4-2010). A second possible theory for the lack of institutional investors
in the Canadian suburbs could be that they do exist, but have aggregate holdings lower than
the 100 million USD threshold in this quarter or for the previous three quarters, and are not
compelled to report. As such, further study will be needed to shed light on this matter.
Figure 6.8: Schematic view of Burgess’s Centrality Model. I) Central Business District (CBD),
II) Factory Zone, III) Zone of Transition/ Inner City, IV) Working Class Zone, V) Residential
Zone, VI) Commuter Zone
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Figure 6.9: Distance vs Density
6.2.2 Effective Use of Capital
As explored previously in Green, O’Hagan, and Lefebvre (2014), investors on the Island of
Manhattan showed clustering behaviour above the level that would be thought of by random
chance. However, it did not translate to higher capital efficiency as measured by the weighted
average P/E ratio for an investor. Will this trend continue for Chicago, Toronto and Montreal?
New York Drawing from Figure 6.10, institutional investors are clustered into three broad
groups with regards to their distance from the New York Stock Exchange(NYSE) located at
11 Wall Street: The first group (log102meters to log103meters) represents the firms located in
the historical financial district surrounding the NYSE; the second cluster (log103.5meters to
log104meters) contains the main cluster of institutional investors in Midtown discovered by
Green, O’Hagan, and Lefebvre (2014) as well as some of the surrounding investors in
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Hoboken and the other 4 Burroughs of New York proper; and lastly the third cluster (greater
than log104.5meters) represents the investors in the greater New York Metropolitan Area in
Connecticut, New Jersey as well as a handful of investors in Pennsylvania. However, Table
6.5 shows that there is no meaningful relationship between the distance from the NYSE and
the efficiency of capital despite the statistically significant relationship as per the correlation
test since the R2 value explains 1% of the relationship between the two variables.
In the Green, O’Hagan, and Lefebvre (2014) paper, the New York Subway System was not
used as a proxy for adherence to the urban core. As demonstrated in Figure 6.11, this metric
gives two major clusters in which 70% of all institutional investors are located within 1000
meters of a subway stop. Again as with the previous analysis, there is a statistically significant
correlation that explains only 1% of the relationship between the two variables. As such, this
relationship is conceptually meaningless.
Chicago Chicagoans call the neighbourhood that contains the CBD “The Loop”. Figures
6.10 and 6.4, indicate that institutional investors can be clustered into two broad groups -
investors within The Loop, and those outside of The Loop. As it happens, this also serves as a
good rule of thumb for grouping investors with regards to their distance from the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME) located at 20 South Wacker Drive since that address is located
within The Loop. However, as in Table 6.5, there is no statistically significant relationship
between the return on invested capital between firms inside or outside of The Loop.
Also, the fact that The Loop district is named after a loop in Chicago’s elevated trolley
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system that surrounds the downtown and thus the financial district (Moffat 1995), it is not
surprising that the results from the analysis of this criteria of downtownness is for all practical
purpose identical to the previous analysis.
Toronto Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.3, indicate that when the distance is transformed via
log10, there is almost no clustering in the distance from the Toronto Stock Exchange - located
at 130 King Street West. In addition, all of Toronto’s institutional investors fit within the
boundries of the City of Toronto as it existed prior to the amalgamation that happened in 1998
(City of Toronto 2012). Table 6.5 shows that there is no statistically significant relationship
between the return on invested capital and the distance to the TSX.
Unlike Chicago, using the distance to a main subway line greatly increases the criteria of
downtownness when compared to the distance from the TSX. Except for increased
concentration, there is no appreciable difference than the previous correlation model.
Montreal Institutional investors in Montreal are clustered near the Montreal Exchange
(MX- French: Bourse de Montre´al) in the downtown core of the city. Figure 6.10 and Figure
6.2 show that the furthest institutional investor in Montreal is located a mere 1125m away
from the MX. There is a relationship at the 0.9 level with increasing returns on capital the
further away one is from the exchange. Since the critical value is p = 0.05, the null hypothesis
must be accepted. Therefore, there is no statistically significant relationship in the data.
Similarly to Toronto, the use of subway stops clustered the data when measuring
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downtownness. As with the previous case, comparing distance from the MX to the investor,
there is no statistical distance function between these two variables.
6.2.3 Distance and Size
In the previous section, the relationship between location and return on investment was
investigated, and as with previous results in Green, O’Hagan, and Lefebvre (2014), there are
no significant and meaningful spatial relationships between distance and the return on
effective capital. However, looking at the total of the assets under management for each
investor against the distance from the main exchange, only Chicago has an interesting
relationship indicative of distance decay. There is a negative correlation between distance
from The Loop investors and their total aggregate assets7. As demonstrated in Figure 6.2.3,
the negative relationship between distance and aggregate holdings explains that approximately
6% of the assets under management is the result of their distance from the CMX in log10
meters.
Using an independent t-test, investors located within “The Loop” have more assets under
management (mean = 8.85 billion, SE = 0.10), than investors located outside of The Loop
(mean=8.28 billion, SE= 0.18). This difference is significant t(147)= 2.867, p=0.005. This
presents a small size effect at r = 0.23. The difference between the average log10 of
institutional investors Levine’s test of homogeneity is f = 0.242, p = 0.623, indicating that
the variation in variance between the two samples is not due to random fluctuations.
7A similar relationship also exists between the distance between the investor and the CME, however the
relationship between the investor and The Loop is stronger, as well as having a 95% overlap in membership
between the two relationships. (See Figure 6.2.3)
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Figure 6.10: Scatter-plot of relationship between distance to stock exchange and capital
efficiency. Distances are in log10 of metres between the headquarders address of institutional
investors and the location of the city’s main stock exchange (New York = New York Stock
Exchange, Chicago = Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Toronto = Toronto Stock Exchange
and Montreal = Montreal Stock Exchange), and capital efficiency as measured as the stock-
weighted average of holding PE/Ratio.
Chapter 6. The Cities 122
City t d f p-Value Cor r2
Montreal 1.81 11 0.10 0.48 0.23
Toronto -0.48 45 0.63 -0.07 0.00
Chicago 1.34 147 0.17 0.11 0.01
New York 2.17 854 0.03 0.07 0.01
Table 6.5: Correlation Between Distance from Institutional Investor to Stock Exchange and
Return on Investment
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Figure 6.11: Scatter-plot of relationship between distance between the institutional investor
and the nearest subway/El stop and capital efficiency. Distances are in log10 of metres, and
capital efficiency as measured as the stock-weighted average of holding PE/Ratio.
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City t d f p-Value Cor r2
Montreal 0.87 11.00 0.40 0.25 0.06
Toronto 0.90 45.00 0.37 0.13 0.02
Chicago 1.61 147.00 0.11 0.13 0.02
New York 3.38 854.00 0.00 0.11 0.01
Table 6.6: Correlation Between Distance from Institutional Investor to Nearest Mass Transit
Station and Return on Capital
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Figure 6.12: Scatter-plot of relationship between distance to stock exchange and Aggregate
Holdings. Distances are in log10 of metres between the headquarders address of instiutional
investors and the location of the city’s main stock exchange (New York = New York Stock
Exchange, Chicago = Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Toronto = Toronto Stock Exchange and
Montreal = Montreal Stock Exchange), and aggregate holdings are the log10 of the sum of all
reported 13f assets under management
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City t d f p-Value Cor r2
Montreal 2.17 11 0.06 0.54 0.29
Toronto -0.40 45 0.70 -0.06 0.00
Chicago -2.47 147 0.01 -0.20 0.04
New York 0.19 854 0.85 0.01 0.00
Table 6.7: Correlation Between Distance from Institutional Investor to Stock Exchange and
Total Holdings
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Figure 6.13: Scatter-plot of relationship between distance between the institutional investor
and the nearest subway/El stop and aggregate holdings. Distances are in log10 of metres, and
aggregate holdings are the log10 of the sum of all reported 13f assets under management.
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City t d f p-Value Cor r2
Montreal 0.09 11.00 0.93 0.03 0.00
Toronto -0.82 45.00 0.42 -0.12 0.01
Chicago -2.93 147.00 0.00 -0.23 0.06
New York -0.33 854.00 0.74 -0.01 0.00
Table 6.8: Correlation Between Distance from Institutional Investor to Nearest Mass Transit
Station and Total Holdings
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6.3 Conclusions
It is evident from this chapter that investors in Canadian cities are different from investors in
American cities and that differentiation is visible. Constant with the theory that smaller
investors prefer investing in the home market, there is a detectable difference between the
average size of holdings for investors in cities across the border, and that the differences are
not statistically significant when comparing investor size within national borders.
Furthermore, the provincial trend of economic specialization with regards to portfolio
distribution by economic sector continues at the city level, with investors north of the border
showing a preference for natural resources stocks while American investors have preferences
indistinguishable from the global distribution.
This chapter indicates that the geocoded addresses of investors in Montreal, Toronto,
Chicago and New York exhibits some differences with regards to how they handle their
investments. The most striking difference between cities is that investors in Montreal and
Toronto are absent from suburban space, whereas suburban investors are an important fraction
of investors in the Chicago and New York standard metropolitan statistical area. Consistent
with Green, O’Hagan, and Lefebvre (2014), there is no geographic autocorrelation in each
city when examining the effective use of capital by institutional investments. This is expected,
since in a highly competitive field, it would be surprising to find that one could use their
capital more efficiently by virtue of co-location. That being said, of the four cities, only
Chicago’s investors show a clear but modest distance decay function with total assets held
under management and distance to the city’s CBD. Whether this is a temporal anomaly or
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stems from Daniel Burnham’s Chicago plan of 1909 that discouraged the establishment of
businesses outside of the central business district (Hall 2002), this would require longer term
analysis in future studies.
Chapter 7
Conclusions
Contemporary uses of 13F disclosures often pertain to ”whale watching” by amateur investors
trying to match the performance of their favourite “rockstar” investors such as Warren Buffet,
George Soros and John Paulson (Brodie 2013). However, while making investment decisions
predicated on matching successful investors 45 days at the earliest may seem like a
questionable investment strategy; the 13F disclosure system is a rich — if underused — tool
for academic research since it has many of the qualities sought by traditional sampling
techniques: High response rate, broad sampling of the subject population and regular updates.
These qualities are achieved since the data is given to the US government under penalty of
perjury every quarter by each institutional investor with more than 100 million dollars of
eligible securities - not that it helped authorities spot the infamous Bernie Maddoff’s ponzi
scheme.
Most importantly from the perspective of geography, the 13F forms can become spatial
documents since they include the business address of the person ultimately responsible for the
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assets under management. Therefore each address can be located to the exact centre of each
business’s building. Naturally, building on the vast command and control literature in
geography, this type of spatially aware data can be used to derive insights based on the
location of institutional investors as well as the location of their holdings.
Looking at the literature of institutional investment, especially as it deals to financial
geography, two things become readily apparent: The literature often predates the great
Dot.Com bust in 2001 and none of the literature deals directly with Canada. When it deals
with Canada, it is of a peripheral nature and it assumes that truths from the American
experience is generally applicable to the Canadian context. This assumption is false in many
instances such as preferred investments, inter-ownership relationships of the Canadian “Big
5” banks compared to the eight too big to fail (TBTF) American banks, the inter-provincial
ownership matrix as well as the location preference of institutional investors within their
respective cities.
7.1 International
Considering that the 13F disclosure system is based in United States law (Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934) it is no surprise that American investors dominate the database.
However, surprisingly that Canada comes in as the second on the list countries with the most
capital invested by institutional investors, beating out titans of world finance such as the UK1
1It would be an unfair comparison to include the Crown Dependencies as well as British Over Seas Territories
into the United Kingdom’s total. While this would make the UK larger than Canada in terms of total assets and
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and Japan. Furthermore, Canada comes in third with number of investors per country on the
list behind the United States and the United Kingdom.
The next question after locating Canada within the hierarchy of institutional investors by
total dollars invested in 13F eligible securities, is how different the foreign-based institutional
investors are from American-based institutional investors. As it turns out, institutional
investors located outside of the United States are on average larger than their counterparts
located in the United States when using both the median and the mean of total assets reported.
That being said, the distribution of assets per investor per country for companies located
outside of the United States has a lower Gini coefficient than American institutional investors,
suggesting that many smaller foreign investors find it more efficient to invest in the home
market rather than expend more energy to invest abroad in the United States. Another way to
get around this handicap is to invest with other American-based funds via a fund-of-funds
arrangement.
Similarly, statistical models show that institutional investors located outside of the United
States have a preference for investing in mid-sized firms when compared to the investment
distribution of their American competitors. This results is consistent with the theory of using
information asymmetry for trading advantage. Larger firms would be better known, and
information would is ubiquitous, thereby negating the advantages of in-depth research. On the
other hand, small companies would not offer enough absolute returns to compensate for the
total number of investors, these locations are separate legal entities in personal union with the Crown of Great
Britain, Northern Ireland and the Commonwealth Realms. With regards to finance, these regions exercise local
rule independent of Westminster. Conversely, Canada does not have any such entities that exist under a different
legal/sovereignty regime. (The Ministry of Justice Crown Dependencies Branch 2011).
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effort needed to research the company. Furthermore, investors from non-American companies
are more likely than American firms to invest disproportionately in certain industries. A
logical conclusion of these lines of evidence is that non-US based investors have a viable
strategy in selecting a narrow and deep slice of available investment opportunities.
The lack of bank meltdowns north of the Canadian border during the 2007-2008 US
sub-prime banking crisis was seen by many, that a fundamental difference exist between
Canadian and American banks2 (Calomiris 2013; Calomiris and Haber 2014). Using 13F
data, it is possible to show that their investments are quite different across borders. As
reported in earlier research, Canadian banks have a high degree of inter-ownership. However,
while the American banks have strong inter-ownerships ties when measuring in absolute
dollar amounts, this represents a much smaller share of inter-ownership in terms of relative
ownership. Furthermore, this study shows that using multidimensional scaling and median
polish models that bank inter-ownership matrices have a high concentration within national
borders as well as relatively insignificant cross-border ownership between American and
Canadian banks.
7.2 Inter-provincial
The main take-away from analyzing the inter-provincial flows of institutional investor money
is that Ontario is the most important province for both hosting institutional investors investing
2Although it should be noted that the crisis stemmed from non-traditional investment, principally in mortgage
backed securities and their derivatives, neither of which are reported on the 13F form (Stoller 2012).
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in Canada, as well as attracting the most money from international and domestic investors.
However, while New York City may be thought of as the centre of the financial universe, its
position in terms of hosting institutional investment in the United States is less dominant than
Toronto is vis-a-vis Canada. In a similar vein, while Montreal is a ghost of its former self as a
banking centre, its history is still evident in the location of its investors. As such, Montreal is
the host to the second most institutional investors investing in Canadian firms. Wheareas, due
to the oil and gas boom in Alberta, Calgary is the city with the second highest number of firms
headquartered receiving Canadian funds.
As suggested in the previous paragraph, Canadian investors have a tendency to favour
primary sector investments with oil and gas companies in particular. This trend if further
exaggerated in both Montreal and Calgary, which have an investment distribution even more
skewed to the primary sector as well as oil and gas than the Canadian national distribution.
7.3 Inter-City Comparison
This section used the high resolution geocoding dataset by Esri in order to geolocate all
institutional investors to the geographic centre of their office building in order to build four
high accuracy maps of institutional investors in Montreal, Toronto, Chicago and New York. A
quick glance at the maps 6.2, 6.3, 6.5 and 6.7 in Chapter 6 , shows an interesting pattern: the
Canadian firms are clustered in what Burgess would call the central business district (CBD),
whereas the American cities have a more diffuse distribution, while still having an important
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share in the CBD.
Furthermore, the concept of coreness was mesured in two different and independent
methods. The first is the distance from institutional investors to the city’s stock/ commodity/
mercantile exchange. The second method is the distance from the investor urban mass transit
systems such as the subway in Montreal, Toronto and New York as well as the elevated transit
in Chicago. In both cases, Canadian investors were absent in the hinterland, whereas
American cities showed a bimodal distribution when the distance was transformed into log10
of meters, implying a spatial preference for the downtown core and the suburbs/commuter
zone as well as an aversion for the industrial transition zone.
7.4 Limitations and Future Work
It should be noted that this work is predicated on a few important key assumptions, and that if
these turn out to be unjustified, the sum of the conclusions may be better explained by other
means. The main assumption underpinning much of the intellectual theory of this study is that
the individual who takes ultimate legal responsibility for the investment has a strong influence
on the strategy and can exercise effective day-to-day control. The multi-billion dollar trading
losses at JPMorgan Chase, by rogue trader Bruno Iksil (also known as the London Whale)
working out of the UK office in 2012, can be seen as making a case that modern trading is
frequently divorced from the physical location of those who have ultimate responsibility over
trading activities — in this case Ina Drew out of the New York office. In fact, the independent
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external review commissioned by JPMorgan Chase after the incident apportioned the largest
part of the blame to Ina Drew — the Chief Investment Officer at JPMorgan Chase — for
failing to keep her subordinates in accordance with the company’s investment strategy, which
prompted her resignation from the firm (WilmerHale 2013).
In the case of the London Whale, the trades were centred on hedging credit default swaps
(CDS) rather than 13F securities. Nevertheless, the main lesson from the internal review is
that the Chief Investment Officer has ultimate responsibility for trades in their portfolio, and
as such has the duty of care to make sure that their strategy is followed.
A second major assumption over the use of 13F securites is that they are in fact truthful
assertions of reality. The massive ponzi scheme orchestrated by Bernie Madoff in recent years
shows that filing on pain of perjury may be an imperfect structure without regular audits to
ensure veracity of the statements. That being said, since there is no way to independently
audit all of the institutional investors, there is no choice but to take the disclosures at face
value, knowing that these only represent a snapshot of the holdings on one specific day each
quarter.
In a related note to the extreme temporal limitations of the data, it has been known for
over a century that speculators would, in an efficient market, have a long run expectations of
breaking even with the performance of the market (Bachelier 1900). That being said,
Bachelier’s work did not factor the costs of managing investments. In practice, this means that
while a fund manager may ”beat the market” during a short period, the odds of outperforming
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the market on a long term basis is decidedly negative (Bogle 2005; Di Mascio 2007).
Therefore, these results should only be taken as preliminary until a longer term survey can be
done.
Mapping the location of institutional investors in Canada is an important first step and can
be the launching pad for further important research. For example, the high reliance on oil and
gas investment by Canadian institutional investors could make them vulnerable to losses due
to stranded costs in their investments brought on by market forces such as the softening of
fossil fuel demand lead by a mixture of renewable energy and/or carbon taxes. This could also
be further used to map out second order losses by institutional investors, including pension
plans, in order to better estimate the costs of carbon mitigation policies.
Furthermore, an interesting future avenue of research would be to combine the
information gleaned from the 13F and COMPUSTAT databases with the 13D database for
activist shareholders. The combined information could then be used to find out whether
geographical proximity to the company that they want to influence has a noticeable impact on
their odds of successfully influencing the board, let alone their odds of deciding whether to
file such a report/proposal in the first place. As with the previous limitations of the current
study, it goes without saying that this would be best studied when using time series methods.
Notwithstanding the limited time-frame of this study, providing an initial map of
institutional investment in Canada and showing that is it structurally different than their
American counterparts should go a long way to bringing back the study of institutional
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investment though a geographic lens.
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Appendix A
Total Institutional Investment by
Canadian Investor
Table A.1: Total institutional investment assets by country as
well as total number of institutional investors by country
Institutional Investor Assets Under Management City
Royal Bank of Canada $98,695 Million UDS Toronto
Bank of Montreal/Harris Financial
Co.
$50,019 Million UDS Toronto
Toronto Dominion Bank $48,420 Million UDS Toronto
Caisse de Depot et Placement du
Que´bec
$41,297 Million UDS Montreal
Mackenzie Financial Corp. $22,825 Million UDS Toronto
Bank of Nova Scotia $22,667 Million UDS Toronto
Jarislowsky, Fraser Ltd. $21,679 Million UDS Montreal
IG Investment Management Ltd $21,121 Million UDS Winnipeg
Canadian Imperial Bank of
Commerce
$16,330 Million UDS Toronto
McLean Budden Ltd. $14,870 Million UDS Toronto
Manulife Asset Management
(North America)
$13,110 Million UDS Toronto
Goodman & Company, Investment
Counsel Ltd.
$12,382 Million UDS Toronto
Great West Life Assurance Co.
(Can)
$12,235 Million UDS Winnipeg
Canada Pension Plan Investment
Board
$11,245 Million UDS Toronto
Public Sector Investment Board $11,243 Million UDS Montreal
Ontario Teachers Pension Plan
Board
$10,718 Million UDS Toronto
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Institutional Investor Assets Under Management City
Greystone Managed Investments
Inc.
$10,183 Million UDS Regina
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. $8,051 Million UDS Toronto
Ci Investments Inc. $7,990 Million UDS Toronto
Letko, Brosseau & Associates Inc. $7,961 Million UDS Montreal
Connor Clark & Lunn Investment
Management Ltd.
$7,168 Million UDS Vancouver
Omers Administration Corp. $7,093 Million UDS Toronto
Brookfield Asset Management $7,055 Million UDS Toronto
British Columbia Investment
Management Corp.
$6,232 Million UDS Victoria
Scheer, Rowlett & Associates
Investment Management Ltd.
$4,970 Million UDS Toronto
Fierra Sceptre Inc. $4,808 Million UDS Montreal
Polar Securities Inc. $4,642 Million UDS Montreal
Natcan Investment Management
Inc.
$4,417 Million UDS Montreal
AGF Investments Inc. $3,908 Million UDS Toronto
Guardian Capital Lp. $3,853 Million UDS Toronto
Tetrem Capital Management Ltd. $3,773 Million UDS Toronto
Her Majesty The Queen In Right
Of The Province Of Alberta As
Represented By Alberta Investment
Management Corp
$3,372 Million UDS Edmonton
Fairfax Financial Holdings Ltd.
(Can)
$2,924 Million UDS Toronto
Burgundy Asset Management Ltd. $2,873 Million UDS Toronto
Highstreet Asset Management Inc. $2,867 Million UDS London
Acuity Investment Management
Inc.
$2,541 Million UDS Toronto
Sprucegrove Investment
Management Ltd.
$2,367 Million UDS Toronto
Sectoral Asset Management Ltd. $2,364 Million UDS Montreal
Hexavest Inc. $1,995 Million UDS Montreal
PCJ Investment Management Inc. $1,722 Million UDS Toronto
TDAM USA Inc. $1,443 Million UDS Toronto
Intact Investment Management Inc. $1,279 Million UDS Toronto
Portland Investment Council Inc. $910 Million UDS Toronto
Montrusco Bolton Investments Inc. $862 Million UDS Montreal
Lincluden Management Ltd. $768 Million UDS Toronto
Sun Life Financial & Co. Ltd. $764 Million UDS Toronto
Counsel Portfolio Services Inc. $554 Million UDS Toronto
Continued on next page
Chapter A. Total Institutional Investment by Canadian Investor 147
Table A.1 – continued from previous page
Institutional Investor Assets Under Management City
Sprott Asset Management Lp. $456 Million UDS Toronto
Gluskin, Sheff & Associates Inc. $438 Million UDS Toronto
Foyston, Gordon & Payne Inc. $425 Million UDS Toronto
Chou Associates Management Inc. $398 Million UDS Toronto
Vertex One Asset Management Inc. $396 Million UDS Vancouver
Brockhouse & Cooper International
Inc.
$327 Million UDS Montreal
Kern Cobalt Co-Investment Parters
AP. Lp.
$288 Million UDS Calgary
Nexus Investment Management
Inc.
$287 Million UDS Toronto
Jones Collombin Investment
Counsel Inc.
$238 Million UDS Toronto
K.J. Harrison Partners Inc. $230 Million UDS Toronto
Heatherbridge Capital Management
Ltd.
$165 Million UDS Toronto
Presima Inc. $163 Million UDS Montreal
Hillsdale Investment Management
Inc.
$160 Million UDS Toronto
Guardian Capital Advisors Lp. $157 Million UDS Toronto
West Face Capital Inc. $157 Million UDS Toronto
Bloombergsen Investment Partners $152 Million UDS Toronto
Davis-Rea Ltd. $135 Million UDS Toronto
Sarbit Advisory Services Inc. $131 Million UDS Winnipeg
Thornmark Asset Management Inc. $125 Million UDS Toronto
1346049 Ontario Ltd. $99 Million UDS Toronto
Baskin Financial Services Inc. $88 Million UDS Toronto
Gyrus Investment Services Inc. $44 Million UDS Toronto
Gryphon International Investment
Corp.
$12 Million UDS Toronto
Power Corp. of Canada $11 Million UDS Montreal
Rosenfield Eric $7 Million UDS Toronto
Appendix B
Economic Sector by GICS Codes
Economic Sector GICS Code
Primary:
This economic sector gathers
natural resources for further
transformation by the secondary
sector. This sector encompasses
Agriculture, Forestry, Mining as
well as Oil and Gas Production.
10101010, 10102010, 10102020, 10102050,
15104020, 15104030, 15104040, 15104045,
15105010, 30202010, 30202020
Secondary:
This economic sector takes the
raw materials from the primary
economic sector and transform
them into a finished product.
This would comprise nearly all
manufacturing processes from
consumer discretionary items
except for high end electronics
to durable goods such as housing
construction and automobiles.
10101020, 10102030, 10102040, 15101010,
15101020, 15101030, 15101040, 15101050,
15102010, 15103010, 15103020, 15104010,
15104050, 15105020, 20101010, 20102010,
20103010, 20104010, 20104020, 20105010,
20106010, 20106015, 20106020, 25101010,
25101020, 25102010, 25102020, 25201010,
25201020, 25201030, 25201040, 25201050,
25202010, 25202020, 25203010, 25203020,
25203030, 30201010, 30201020, 30201030,
30202030, 30203010, 30301010, 30302010,
35101010, 35101020
Continued on next page
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Table B.1 – continued from previous page
Economic Sector GICS Code
Tertiary:
This economic sector provides
services to other businesses as
well as the end users. This
would comprise most consulting,
professional services (except some
IT), insurance, finance, health-
care, government, police/security,
entertainment, retail, wholesale and
real estate.
20107010, 20201010, 20201030, 20201040,
20201050, 20201060, 20201070, 20201080,
20202010, 20301010, 20302010, 20303010,
20304010, 20304020, 20305010, 20305020,
20305030, 25301010, 25301020, 25301040,
25302020, 25401010, 25401020, 25401025,
25401030, 25401040, 25501010, 25502010,
25502020, 25503010, 25503020, 25504010,
25504020, 25504030, 25504040, 25504050,
25504060, 30101010, 30101020, 30101030,
30101040, 35102010, 35102015, 35102020,
35102030, 40101010, 40101015, 40102010,
40201010, 40201020, 40201030, 40202010,
40203010, 40203030, 40301010, 40301020,
40301030, 40301040, 40301050, 40401010,
40401020, 40402010, 40402020, 40402030,
40402040, 40402050, 40402060, 40402070,
40403010, 40403020, 40403030, 40403040,
45103030, 45203030, 50101010, 50101020,
50102010, 55101010, 55102010, 55103010,
55104010, 55105010
Quaternary:
This economic sector is often
referred to as the “Knowledge
Economy”. This sector creates
and disseminates information as a
service and as such contains high
end research and development,
pharmaceuticals, information
technology and higher education.
20201020, 20202020, 25302010, 35103010,
35201010, 35202010, 35203010, 40201040,
40203020, 45101010, 45102010, 45102020,
45103010, 45103020, 45201020, 45201010,
45201020, 45202010, 45202010, 45202020,
45203010, 45203020, 45204010, 45205010,
45205020, 45301010, 45301020
Table B.1: Breakdown of GICS by Economic Sector
Definitions for each GICS code can be found here: http://www.msci.com/resources/
xls/GICS\_map2010.xls
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